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1 Introduction 
Within the literature and research on international regimes, there is an ongoing debate about 
the need for enforcement. Do regimes need enforcement mechanisms in order to get member 
states to comply with their commitments? The “enforcement school” and “management 
school”1
In Helmut Breitmeier, Oran Young and Michael Zürn’s book (2006) entitled Analyzing 
International Environmental Regimes, two of the authors have each done statistical analyses 
using data from the International Regimes Database (IRD). Chapter 3 in the book, mainly 
written by Michael Zürn
 have diverging views on this. Advocates of the enforcement school emphasize the 
need for strong enforcement mechanisms to ensure the member states’ compliance, whereas 
the management school stresses the need for capacity building and other facilitative 
mechanisms in order to accommodate compliance.  
2
Nevertheless, Young and Zürn arrive at very different conclusions: Zürn concludes that 
enforcement mechanisms are essential for compliance: “…evidence drawn from the IRD 
indicates clearly that international environmental regimes that establish mechanisms of 
horizontal sanctioning and strong verification procedures do better than average with regard 
to compliance” (Breitmeier et al 2006:110). Young finds most support for the management 
school: “Regimes that rely on a management approach succeed in fulfilling goals 86.1 percent 
, examines horizontal mechanisms for inducing compliance. Chapter 
4, mainly written by Oran Young, examines the effect of decision rules and compliance 
mechanisms on regime effectiveness. There are several similarities between the two analyses: 
they use the same dataset and the same analytical technique, they have one independent 
variable in common, and even though their dependent constructs (compliance and regime 
effectiveness) differ, they are closely related.  
                                                 
1 The management school is also frequently termed the “managerial school”. In this thesis, management school 
is the preferred term.   
2 Officially, all chapters in the book are written by all three authors (Breitmeier, Young and Zürn). However, it 
seemed strange to me that two chapters with such different conclusions were written by the same authors. A 
suspicion that Zürn was the author behind chapter 3 and Young the author behind chapter 4 was confirmed by 
the authors through e-mail correspondence. In an e-mail dated 13.10.10, Michael Zürn writes: “… your 
assumptions about the authorship contains certainly some truth (and you certainly can express this in your thesis) 
...” In an e-mail dated 12.10.10, Oran Young writes: “Well, your guess is not completely off base. Michael 
prepared the FIRST draft of Ch. 3, while I did the same for Ch. 4. BUT it is important to note that the book is a 
fully joint work in the sense that we all signed onto the whole text.” 
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of the time …” (Breitmeier et al 2006:190) and concludes that “… the evidence we have 
presented in this chapter suggests that there is no reason to dismiss international regimes 
because of their … tendency to avoid familiar enforcement mechanisms” (Breitmeier et al 
2006:190).  
1.1 Research question 
In this thesis, I take a closer look at Young and Zürn’s analyses in order to identify why the 
two authors conclude so differently. The research question for this thesis is as follows: 
What explains why Young and Zürn have reached different conclusions with regard to 
compliance mechanisms, compliance and regime effectiveness despite the many similarities of 
their analyses?  
1.2 Theoretical background 
1.2.1 Compliance and regime effectiveness 
Compliance within international environmental regimes “can be said to occur when the actual 
behavior of a given subject conforms to prescribed behavior, and non-compliance or violation 
occurs when actual behavior departs significantly from prescribed behavior” (Young cited in 
Breitmeier et al 2006:65). Compliance thus refers to a situation where the member states’ 
actions are in accordance with the regime’s rules and regulations. However, it is important to 
notice that compliance is no direct indicator of a regime’s effectiveness nor an indicator of 
actual effects of the regime in nature: “Compliance differs from other topics dealing with the 
consequences of regulations, including their implementation and effectiveness” (Breitmeier et 
al 2006:64).  
Incentives for compliance is one of three necessary components of regime effectiveness, 
according to Barrett (2006:242). This links compliance closely to regime effectiveness. The 
other two components needed for a regime to be effective are broad participation and deep 
commitments (Barrett 2006:244). According to Underdal (2002:4), “a regime can be 
considered effective to the extent that it successfully performs a certain (set of) function(s) or 
solves the problem(s) that motivated its establishment.”     
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1.2.2 Approaches to compliance 
There is significant disagreement among researchers regarding what mechanisms are needed 
to make states comply with international environmental agreements. Scholars differ over 
whether positive and negative compliance mechanisms are required, or if facilitative 
mechanisms are sufficient. In other words, they disagree about the need for enforcement. 
The two main perspectives on enforcement and compliance within this area of research are 
the enforcement school and the management school. The social-practice perspective is a third 
approach. The enforcement school emphasizes the need for strict enforcement by making use 
of positive and negative incentives. “Carrots” are positive incentives such as side payments, 
issue linkages or other additional entitlements (like additional emission permits) (Barrett and 
Stavins 2003:360-361). “Sticks,” on the other hand, are negative incentives – mechanisms for 
punishment if states are non-compliant. Examples include trade restrictions and lower 
emission permits, economic punishments and suspension of member privileges (such as 
voting rights) (Barrett and Stavins 2003:362-365). This school argues that states are 
concerned primarily with their national interest, and use a cost-benefit calculus when deciding 
whether or not to comply. If the benefit of complying is greater than the cost, one will choose 
to comply but if the opposite is true, the chances for compliant behavior are small (Breitmeier 
et al 2006:149).  
The other school of thought, the management school, views norms, knowledge and capacity 
building as the most important determinants for compliant behavior. A basic norm in 
international law is that all international laws should be obeyed: pacta sunt servanda – 
“treaties are to be obeyed” (Chayes and Chayes 1995:185). Such a norm reduces the need for 
use of enforcement and coercion. States generally want to comply with treaty obligations. 
When states are in noncompliance, this is not due to the fact that they do not want to comply 
but rather due to inability to comply. Chayes and Chayes (1995:188-196) identify several 
reasons for non-compliance: The treaty’s ambiguity, the states’ capacity (or lack of capacity) 
to comply and insufficient time to adjust to regulations prescribed by a treaty. The first 
reason, ambiguity, implies that words in the agreements can be misinterpreted or 
misunderstood. Ambiguity is often the result of long and difficult multilateral negotiations, 
where the agreed text is twisted and turned in order to meet all countries’ concerns. 
Understanding the different wordings properly can be challenging and thus states may 
become unsure what is compliant behavior and what is not (Chayes and Chayes 1995:188, 
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189). The second reason concerns different limitations in a state’s capacity to comply with an 
agreement. Insufficient technological capacity or lack of economic or political resources are 
examples of this. Weak national bureaucratic structures and regulating capacity are other 
aspects (Chayes and Chayes 1995:193, 194). States need scientific, technical, bureaucratic 
and financial capacity in order to create national enforcement systems for the agreement. The 
third reason for non-compliance, “the temporal dimension” (Chayes and Chayes 1995:195), 
concerns the time it takes for a country to adjust to regulations prescribed by a treaty: 
“Significant changes in social or economic systems mandated by regulatory treaties take time 
to accomplish” (Chayes and Chayes 1995:195). A period of transition between the 
undertaking and implementation of an agreement may be necessary in order to adjust national 
systems.  
The social practice approach to compliance advocates that “actors are likely to comply with 
the provisions of the regimes for reasons that do not lend themselves to calculations of 
benefits and costs …” (Breitmeier et al 2006:155). In this perspective, incentives play a minor 
role; a logic of appropriateness motivates actors to comply. Compliance depends upon the 
overall character of the regime, and especially the attitudes of the parties toward the regime, 
rather than well-defined compliance mechanisms (Breitmeier et al 2006:155).  
1.3 Michael Zürn’s analysis 
In chapter 3 in Analyzing International Environmental Regimes (Breitmeier et al 2006), 
Michael Zürn analyzes the effect of horizontal compliance mechanisms on compliance rates. 
Compliance is the dependent construct examined in Zürn’s analysis. He includes four 
independent constructs: incentives, legalization, legitimization and responsiveness. Each of 
these constructs represents ways to cope with non-compliance problems (Breitmeier et al 
2006:72). These constructs are mechanisms for coping with four different sources of non-
compliance: cheating, the ambiguity of rules, a rule or norm is considered to be wrong, or the 
rule is impractical to comply with for the country in question (Breitmeier et al 2006:71). He 
finds that the first construct, incentives, has the strongest positive effect on compliance. At the 
same time, he finds that capacity building and negotiations are insufficient to achieve high 
levels of compliance. These results give support to the enforcement school. Results from 
Zürn’s analyses also show that juridification has a positive effect on compliance levels. 
“Juridification” implies that rules and regulations are explicit, precise, stringent and 
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consistent. To ensure precise and explicit rules, power is delegated to institutions that are 
largely autonomous, such as national and international courts or tribunals. These institutions 
develop and interpret the rules (Breitmeier et al 2006:79). In this way, ambiguity can be 
avoided.  
Zürn’s results show that “efforts to promote compliance through negotiations and various 
forms of capacity building are not sufficient to induce compliance with international rules and 
regulations” (Breitmeier et al 2006:110). This finding gives little support to the management 
school. He concludes that: “Most successful regimes rely on compliance mechanisms 
involving horizontal sanctioning and institutionalized verification procedures” (Breitmeier et 
al 2006:110). Overall, Zürn’s results largely support the enforcement school.  
1.4 Oran Young’s analysis 
In chapter 4 in Breitmeier et al (2006), Oran Young presents his analyses of the effect of 
decision rules and compliance mechanisms on regime effectiveness. Young presents two 
separate analyses – one on decision-making rules and regime effectiveness, and one on 
compliance mechanisms and regime effectiveness only. The second analysis is considered in 
this thesis. The dependent construct examined in Young’s analyses is regime effectiveness. 
He includes two independent constructs: “nature of the compliance mechanisms,” and 
“approach to compliance.” Nature of the compliance mechanisms refers to what compliance 
mechanisms a regime uses. Approach to compliance refers to whether a regime relies on a 
management or an enforcement approach to compliance.  
Young finds that capacity building, granting of transition periods to achieve compliance, 
notices of violation of rules and having no compliance mechanisms have the strongest 
positive effects on regime effectiveness. His results also support that regimes with a 
management approach to compliance are more effective than those who choose an 
enforcement approach to compliance.  
Young concludes that “[t]his evidence suggests that there are good reasons for selecting a 
management approach over an enforcement approach, at least when the problem at hand is 
environmental in character” (Breitmeier et al 2006:186). He comments only briefly on the 
results for compliance mechanisms associated with the enforcement school, perhaps because 
he finds that few regimes use such mechanisms: “Enforcement is simply not a prominent 
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feature of efforts to promote compliance with international environmental regimes” 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:189). Overall, the results from Young’s analysis largely support the 
management school, although his finding that having no compliance mechanisms also affects 
regime effectiveness positively gives support to the social practice perspective.  
1.5 Research design 
In order to answer my research question, I use both qualitative and quantitative methods.  In 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 I use qualitative method, describing the analyses of Young and Zürn and 
comparing them. In chapter 6 I use quantitative method, more specifically multivariate 
regression. The research process shows that using only qualitative techniques to answer my 
research question is insufficient. The qualitative comparison of Young and Zürn’s analyses in 
chapter 5 does not alone provide clear answers to my research question. It merely indicates 
that the aspects of operationalization, validity and interpretation of results influence the fact 
that the researchers reach different conclusions. Therefore, to find more specific answers, I do 
quantitative analyses in addition to the qualitative examination.   
I present the analyses of Zürn and Young, respectively, in chapters 3 and 4. To be able to 
detect what might explain their differing conclusions, a thorough examination of the two 
analyses is necessary. I identify what data they use, what constructs they study, how they 
operationalize these constructs, what analytical technique they use, the results they obtain and 
the conclusions they draw. By presenting the two analyses using the same framework or 
“checklist,” it is easier to identify similarities and differences between them.  
In chapter 5, I compare the analyses of Young and Zürn using the same checklist as in 
chapters 3 and 4. In addition to this checklist, I add considerations about the authors’ 
theoretical approaches, about validity and about the authors’ interpretations of results.   
I analyze the variables used in Young and Zürn’s bivariate analyses in chapter 6 using 
multivariate regression. I choose multivariate analysis because of the advantages of this 
technique compared to bivariate statistical techniques. By doing multivariate regression 
analyses, I aim to (i) explain more of the variance in the dependent variable, (ii) find more 
robust results by controlling for other independent variables when analyzing one independent 
variable’s effect on a dependent variable, and (iii) find out which independent variables affect 
which dependent variables and which independent variables have no effects at all.  
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1.6 Plan 
Chapter 2 provides an account of the existing theoretical approaches to compliance within the 
literature on international environmental regimes, as well as a brief presentation of regime 
effectiveness. Chapter 3 offers an in-depth examination of Zürn’s analysis, where the 
elements of the checklist are identified. Chapter 4 similarly gives an examination of Young’s 
analysis. I compare and discuss the two analyses in Chapter 5 in order to identify differences 
and possible causes of the differing conclusions. Chapter 6 contains my own statistical 
analysis of compliance and regime effectiveness using regression to analyze the variables 
used by Young and Zürn. Finally Chapter 7 provides a summary of the thesis and a 
presentation of my main findings. 
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2 Theoretical Background 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the concepts of compliance and regime 
effectiveness, including the enforcement school and the management school. Stephen Krasner 
(1982:186) defines international regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations.” A regime often consists of agreements, conventions, treaties, 
protocols and informal understandings among the parties (Breitmeier et al 2006:253, 257). A 
common structure for an international regime might be a framework convention that is 
general in character and several underlying protocols dealing with relevant sub-themes. 
International regimes, both environmental and others, usually come into existence in order to 
solve or manage a common problem that one state alone is unable to deal with (Breitmeier 
2006:254). Examples of such common problems might be transboundary movements of 
hazardous pollutants or waste and trade in endangered animal and plant species. 
Levels of compliance within international environmental regimes should be high in order to 
achieve the regime’s goals and objectives. A country in compliance acts in line with the 
behavior prescribed by the regime (Breitmeier et al 2006:65). However, scholars have 
different views on what mechanisms are required to induce a country to comply with regime 
prescriptions. In short, one group claims that enforcement of compliance may be necessary 
through the use of penalties and rewards (Downs et al 1996; Barrett and Stavins 2003). The 
other group opposes this line of thinking and argues in favor of an approach to regime design 
that values norms and argues in favor of capacity building by the transfer of knowledge, 
technology and financial resources (Young 1989; Chayes & Chayes 1995). The two schools 
have been named the enforcement school and the management school, respectively.  
In section 2.1, I briefly present considerations about international cooperation and the 
anarchic character of the international system. In section 2.2, I present the enforcement school 
and the management school through comparing their views on three issues: (i) why states 
comply with international agreements, (ii) reasons for noncompliance, and (iii) how to make 
countries comply. In section 2.3, I provide an account of regime effectiveness. Finally, in 
section 2.4 I summarize the chapter.   
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2.1 International cooperation in an anarchic world 
Anarchy is one of the main characteristics of the international political system. International 
anarchy has severe implications for the effectiveness of international rules and regulations 
because lack of overarching authority makes enforcement problematic and ensuring that 
countries comply with international environmental regimes becomes difficult. This relates to 
sovereignty – one of the main characteristics of a state. Within a state, the government has 
coercive powers to enforce compliance with domestic policies (Barrett and Stavins 2003:362). 
Østerud (2005:39) refers to this type of sovereignty as internal sovereignty. In contrast, 
external sovereignty refers to a state’s formal independence from other states (or actors). The 
existence of national sovereignty, consequently, means that enforcement of international 
agreements cannot be performed by a world government. Instead, all parties participating in 
an international regime share the responsibility of enforcing the treaties (Barrett and Stavins 
2003:362).  
2.2 The two perspectives – enforcement and 
management 
According to Hovi and Areklett (2003:3), enforcement is a “process of ensuring compliance 
with some behavioural or outcome standard as laid down in an agreement, a rule, a law, a 
norm or in some other way.” They further divide the term into two different concepts: “hard” 
and “soft” enforcement. Hard enforcement entails consequences such as financial punishment 
and suspension of member privileges. Soft enforcement includes capacity building and both 
technical and economic transfers and supervision (Hovi and Areklett 2003:3-4). However, 
some claim that it is only the hard enforcement approach that really exhibits enforcement, 
meaning a regime either has hard enforcement or no enforcement. The soft enforcement 
approach concerns compliance facilitation rather than enforcement of compliance (Hovi and 
Areklett 2003:4). In the following, the hard enforcement approach represents the views of the 
enforcement school whereas the soft, facilitative approach reflects the views of the 
management school. One can identify the differences between these schools by looking at 
their views on different issues. In the following, I elaborate on the two schools in greater 
detail by comparing their views on three issues: (i) why states comply with international 
agreements, (ii) reasons for noncompliance and (iii) how to make countries comply.  
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2.2.1 Why do states comply? Cost/benefit calculus versus norms 
An enforcement scholar would argue that when states comply, it is because it is more costly 
to be noncompliant than to be in compliance with a treaty. In other words, when the country 
individually benefits from cooperation, it will choose to do so. Additionally, the threat of 
punitive sanctions if violations occur will deter a country from not complying with an 
agreement.  
Wrong, the management scholar would reply, arguing that countries are not that cynical in 
their considerations. Rather, states comply with agreements because they follow fundamental 
norms in international society: “Treaties are to be obeyed” (Chayes and Chayes 1993:185). A 
majority of the member states comply with international environmental regimes (and other 
forms of international regulations) most of the time and this is not due to the threat of 
coercive sanctions. Enforcement is only one of many mechanisms inducing countries to 
comply with international regulations (Young 1989:71). An enforcement scholar would 
continue to argue that states’ actions are determined by cost/benefit calculations, but 
management scholars claim to have found empirical evidence supporting their arguments that 
this is not the case. To confirm their claim, Chayes and Chayes (1993:186) use a quote from 
rational choice theorist Jon Elster: “I have come to believe that social norms provide an 
important kind of motivation for action that is irreducible to rationality or indeed to any other 
form of optimizing mechanism.” States will only infrequently willfully defect from their legal 
obligations (Chayes and Chayes 1993:188).   
Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996) argue in favor of the enforcement approach, criticizing 
many of the management school’s findings for being incorrect. They argue that many of the 
findings of management school scholars suffer from serious selection bias, and thus they have 
wrongly concluded that agreements do not need strong enforcement mechanisms in order to 
ensure compliance. Downs et al (1996:380) claim that the management school’s conclusions 
result from the fact that most treaties do not possess deep enough commitments and therefore, 
the member states will only have to make small (possibly insignificant) changes to their 
behavior, in order to comply with agreements. The need for enforcement is therefore small. 
However, future international regimes will have to demand deeper commitments from states 
12 
 
in order to cope with such problems as climate change and arms reduction. Downs et al 
(1996:380) write: 
“… further progress in international regulatory cooperation will almost certainly require the creation of 
agreements that present far greater incentives to defect than those currently in place (e.g., more 
demanding environmental standards, fewer nontariff barriers, steeper arms reductions). We have 
precious little evidence that such progress can be obtained in the absence of better enforcement.” 
The disappointing results about reducing the emissions of CO2 under the Kyoto Protocol is an 
example of why deeper commitments demand increased use of hard enforcement. 
“Enforcement is critical”, Barrett (2003:359) writes, and further concludes that deterrence of 
free-riding together with enforcement of compliance are critical aspects in order for an 
international environmental agreement to succeed. As opposed to the management school, 
which assumes that countries in general are positive towards cooperation and cooperate 
whenever they are able to (Downs et al 1996:380), enforcement scholars believe that 
cooperation fails more often than not (Barrett 2003:360). 
2.2.2 Reasons for noncompliance 
Why do so many international treaties suffer from low levels of compliance? The enforcement 
school and management school have different answers to this question. Enforcement scholars 
pose the same arguments as in the former paragraph: If the costs of complying exceed the 
costs of not complying, a country will choose not to comply and vice versa. According to the 
enforcement school, noncompliance occurs when incentives to comply are lacking. Incentives 
must be in place in order to overcome the problem of free-riding in an agreement.  
Management scholars present a more detailed explanation of why countries fail to comply 
with international agreements. They consider the problem of noncompliance as a problem of 
capacity and ability rather than a result of deliberate cost/benefit calculations (Chayes and 
Chayes 1993; Young 1989). Chayes and Chayes (1993) identify three causes of non-
compliance: ambiguity, incapacity and a time dimension. First, ambiguity refers to language 
matters within an agreement or a treaty. Treaties can either be general or detailed in language. 
A general treaty will be open to many different interpretations, and thus what constitutes 
compliance will largely be a matter of judgment for each country. This may lead to many 
different ways of complying. On the other hand, a detailed treaty also has limitations, 
although one would intuitively think that such a treaty would be more difficult to misinterpret. 
With a detailed treaty, the problem of “expressing one thing excludes another” becomes 
13 
 
relevant. Also, “precision generates loopholes” (Chayes and Chayes 1993:189). To express 
the point explicitly: Countries may be non-compliant although they believe themselves to be 
in compliance. The problem lies in the different interpretations of the written agreement. 
Second, incapacity might hinder a country from being in compliance. This point refers to the 
need for capacity building, one of the bedrocks of the management school. A country can be 
noncompliant if it lacks the technical or financial resources needed for compliance. Lack of a 
functioning and competent domestic regulatory system is an important factor for why a 
country sometimes cannot manage its obligations. Domestic regulatory capacity includes 
bureaucratic capability, availability of financial resources, and technical and scientific 
capacity (Chayes and Chayes (1993:193-194). Such challenges must be dealt with by 
transfers of knowledge, technology and funding to those who lack the capacity to comply 
with international agreements.  
Third, a “temporal dimension”, or insufficient time between the undertaking and 
implementation of an agreement could cause non-compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1993:195). 
Time is an important aspect for ensuring that more states will be able to comply with 
agreements. In order to fulfill obligations demanded by international environmental regimes, 
changes in social, political and economic national systems are usually necessary, and such 
changes take time to complete. Therefore, a period of transition might be necessary for some 
countries – there should be a time lag between the undertaking of an agreement and the 
countries’ performance (Chayes and Chayes 1993:197).     
2.2.3 How to make countries comply – incentives versus facilitation 
According to the enforcement school, one of the main instruments needed to induce countries 
to comply with international treaties is incentives. Countries need both positive and negative 
incentives for compliance. In contrast to this view, the management school emphasizes factors 
such as a country’s reputation within the international community and the importance of 
standard bureaucratic procedures in order to make compliance a standard decision-making 
routine.  
Supporting the enforcement perspective, Barrett and Stavins (2003:350) start out by 
explaining the free-riding incentive within international cooperation expressed through 
nonparticipation and noncompliance. When it comes to collective action problems such as 
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climate change, countries have to spend vast amounts of resources on reducing their 
emissions while at the same time having difficulties seeing the country’s own benefit of doing 
so. “Each country can claim for itself only a small fraction of the global benefit of its 
mitigation efforts, and because marginal abatement costs are increasing, the incentive for 
countries to mitigate climate change on their own is greatly reduced” (Barrett and Stavins 
2003:350). Thus, states need incentives to comply with an agreement. This is a core argument 
within the enforcement school.  
Barrett and Stavins (2003:360-366) identify both positive and negative incentives for 
participation and compliance. Incentives are needed to overcome the problem of free-riding in 
international affairs (Barrett and Stavins 2003:350).  
Examples of positive incentives include side payments, issue linkages and emissions trading. 
A side payment is a money transfer to a party from one or more of the other parties in the 
agreement (Barrett and Stavins 2003:360). The idea is to even out the gains from cooperation 
between the parties by having the ones who gain a lot from an agreement compensate those 
who gain less or even lose from being part of an agreement. The second type of positive 
incentive is issue linkage. Cooperation in one area can be combined with cooperation in 
another and thereby increase a state’s interest in cooperating. This way ensures more parties 
gain from an agreement (Barrett and Stavins 2003:360). The third positive incentive 
mechanism includes the possibility for parties to trade internationally in emission 
entitlements. The way this works is that the countries that easily cut their emissions can sell 
emission quotas to other countries that find it more costly and difficult to cut their emissions. 
This is, of course, only possible if there is a set, total emission cap. Then, for the issue of 
climate change, it is irrelevant who makes the additional emission reductions as long as the 
total of emissions does not exceed the cap. However, this is far from irrelevant to the 
countries because of the costs connected with reducing emissions. This kind of trading 
promotes cooperation because the buyer of quotas is allowed to save costs and the seller is 
allowed to earn revenues (Barrett and Stavins 2003:360). 
In some cases positive incentives might be sufficient to induce countries to comply. But in 
most cases, enforcement scholars would argue, negative incentives are also required in order 
for all countries to be in compliance. Three such mechanisms are identified by Barrett and 
Stavins (2003:362): reciprocal measures, financial penalties and trade restrictions. Reciprocal 
measures refer to measures that involve punishment of the violating party, by the other parties 
15 
 
– a “tit-for-tat” situation. “If you pollute, I (or we) will pollute, too”. The threat that others 
will pollute in retaliation to a party’s violation might deter the member state from violating 
the agreement. However, this is not a plausible measure to use, because if the punishment is 
carried out, not only the violator but the whole natural environment will suffer because total 
mitigation is reduced (Barrett and Stavins 2003:363). Financial penalties represent the second 
negative incentive. This merely implies that member states will be punished financially if they 
do not comply with an agreement. A problem with such sanctions, however, is that they lack 
credibility because there is no international authority to enforce them (Barrett and Stavins 
2003:370). The third type of negative incentive is trade restrictions, for instance in the form of 
a CO2 tax on certain goods (Barrett and Stavins 2003:364). One problem with this, however, 
is that it is difficult to determine the amount of carbon dioxide it has taken to produce a good 
or the total amount of carbon dioxide the good itself will create: “… it would be virtually 
impossible in practice to calculate the carbon emitted in the manufacture and distribution of 
each and every good” (Barrett and Stavins 2003:365). Barrett and Stavins (2003: 370) argue 
that the threat of trade restrictions would not be credible: “Virtually all trade goods result in 
greenhouse gas emissions (during their manufacture, if not their use), and restricting trade in 
all goods and services is simply not credible.”  
Young (1989:71) claims that enforcement represents only one of many mechanisms inducing 
compliance. Presenting views related to those of the management school, he argues that the 
two most important bases for compliance include “decision variables” and “collective-choice 
considerations” (Young 1989:72). “Decision variables” are considerations that take part in the 
calculus of a unitary actor making a decision. One of the arguments within the decision 
variables category is the importance of trust within international society: “A reputation of 
trustworthiness is one of the most valuable assets that any member of international society can 
acquire” (Young 1989:75). Complying with international rules and regulations is a way for a 
country to increase its respect among other members of international society. The other 
category, collective-choice considerations, focuses on the internal decision-making processes 
within states and their influence on compliance with international regimes. This includes 
bureaucratic “tugs-of war” and pressures from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Creating standard operating procedures within and between the government and NGOs is a 
means of ensuring compliance with regimes. This way compliance largely becomes “routine 
practice” (Young 1989:77-79).  
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In conclusion, the absence of an independent authority enforcing international agreements 
does not imply that countries automatically will defect from an agreement as soon as it 
conflicts with their interests (Young 1989:79). There are several other bases for compliance 
within the international system than simply incentives and sanctions.  
2.3 Regime effectiveness 
Underdal (2002:4) provides what he calls a “common sense” definition of regime 
effectiveness: “… a regime can be considered effective to the extent that it successfully 
performs a certain (set of) function(s) or solves the problem(s) that motivated its 
establishment.” The concept of regime effectiveness is much broader and complex than 
compliance because it not only encompasses the member states’ behavior but also the 
regime’s performance in relation to its stated goals and with regard to actual changes in the 
natural environment. Underdal (2002:5-7) suggests dividing the concept into three separate 
parts in order to make the evaluation of effectiveness more feasible. In other words, he 
operationalizes regime effectiveness by looking at three different practically measurable 
aspects: Output – the formal norms, rules, principles and guidelines resulting from a regime 
negotiation process (decision making and regime formation), outcome – the changes in 
human behavior caused by the regime, and impact – the changes in the biophysical 
environment caused by the regime.  
Object Output 
(regime formation) 
Outcome 
(regime implementation) 
 
Impact 
Time Level 1: The 
international 
agreement is signed. 
Level 2:
Measures are in effect, 
and target groups adjust 
 Domestic 
measures are taken. 
Nature responds to 
changes in human 
behavior 
 
Figure 2.1 (Underdal 2002:7) 
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Helm and Sprinz (1999; 2000) have developed a model for measuring regime effectiveness 
called the Oslo-Potsdam solution (Hovi, Sprinz and Underdal 2003:74). In this model, the 
regime’s actual performance (AP) is measured against two baselines: the no-regime 
counterfactual (NR; the hypothetical situation of the non-existence of the regime) and the 
collective optimum (CO; the “ideal” solution) (Helm and Sprinz 2000:636, 637). The formula 
for regime effectiveness (E) is: 
E = 
       CO-NR 
AP-NR 
The distance between the no-regime counterfactual (NR) and the collective optimum (CO) 
represents a regime’s potential. The actual performance (AP) of the regime will likely be 
somewhere in-between NR and CO (Helm and Sprinz 2000:636). “The effectiveness of a 
regime (E) can then be measured as the relative distance that the actual performance has 
moved from the no-regime counterfactual toward the collective optimum or as the percentage 
of the regime potential that has been achieved” (Helm and Sprinz 2000:636). The 
effectiveness “score” varies between 0 and 1 where 0 represents no effectiveness and 1 
represents perfect regime effectiveness (Helm and Sprinz 2000:636).  
2.4 Summary 
Because of the anarchic character of the international political system and the sovereignty of 
states, enforcing international cooperation becomes difficult. Scholars disagree about the need 
for enforcement. Enforcement scholars emphasize so-called “hard” enforcement whereas 
management scholars promote facilitation of compliance, or “soft” enforcement. The two 
perspectives have diverging views on at least three issue areas: Why states cooperate, the 
reasons for noncompliance and what is required to make countries comply with international 
agreements. Where enforcement scholars argue in favor of positive and negative incentives 
like side payments and financial penalties, management scholars view capacity building, 
transfers of knowledge and financial resources as keys to helping countries comply with 
international environmental agreements. 
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Regime effectiveness is a complex concept which can be measured in several different ways. 
In this chapter, two possible ways of measuring regime effectiveness has been presented: 
Underdal’s (2002:7) “output-outcome-impact” model and Helm and Sprinz’ (1999;2000) 
Oslo-Potsdam solution.  
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3 Michael Zürn’s Analysis 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the analyses of Michael Zürn about the effect of 
horizontal compliance mechanisms on compliance levels. Chapter 4 is a similar presentation 
of Oran Young’s research design. By identifying aspects such as the data and constructs used, 
operationalization and analytical technique, I can more easily compare the two analyses and 
identify differences that may have caused Young and Zürn’s differing conclusions. In section 
3.1, I present information about the data. In section 3.2, I provide information about the 
constructs. Section 3.3 includes Zürn’s operationalization and variables. In section 3.4, I 
provide an account of the analytical technique. In section 3.5, I present Zürn’s results, and 
section 3.6 includes his conclusions. Section 3.7 is a brief summary of the chapter.  
3.1 Data 
Both Young and Zürn have used data from the International Regimes Database (IRD) when 
conducting their analyses. The IRD is a database developed by the three authors of 
“Analyzing International Environmental Regimes – From Case Study to Database” (2006), 
Helmut Breitmeier, Oran Young and Michael Zürn. It contains information about 23 
international environmental regimes3
                                                 
3 Antarctic Regime, Baltic Sea Regime, Barents Sea Fisheries Regime, Biodiversity Regime, CITES Regime 
(Trade in Endangered Species), Climate Change Regime, Danuber River Protection Regime, Desertification 
Regime, Great Lakes Management, Hazardous Waste Regime (Basel Convention), IATTC-Regime (Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Convention), ICCAT-Regime (Conservation of Atlantic Tunas), Regime for the 
International Regulation of Whaling, London Convention Regime, ECE-Regime on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution, North Sea Regime, Oil Pollution Regime, Regime for the Protection of the Rhine against 
Pollution, Ramsar Regime on Wetlands, Regime for Protection of the Black Sea, South Pacific Fisheries Forum 
Agency Regime, Stratospheric Ozone Regime, Tropical Timber Trade Regime.   
. The information provided in the database is divided 
into four main sections: regime formation, regime attributes, regime consequences, and 
regime dynamics. The units of analysis were originally thought to be regimes, but since 
regimes often consist of several different components such as treaties, conventions, annexes 
and protocols, which change over time, this proved difficult during trial runs of the data base 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:34). The units of analysis are so-called “regime elements.” Regime 
elements are separate components of a regime (treaty, convention, annex, protocol) but also 
include changes within a regime over time. Breitmeier et al (2006:43) write: “... it became 
apparent that individual regime components often experience major changes over time.” 
Therefore, the regime components have been divided into separate regime elements if major 
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temporal changes occurred. There are three types of major, or “watershed,” changes: when 
there are major changes in the key principles and norms of a regime component, when there 
are changes in the group of leading participating actors (i.e. when two large, influential actors 
like China and India joined the ozone regime in the beginning of the 1990s), and when a 
regime deepens its functional scope, for example, through adding substantive protocols to a 
framework agreement (Breitmeier et al 2006:43) (i.e. the addition of the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC). 172 regime elements represent the units of analysis in the IRD.  
3.2 Constructs  
3.2.1 Dependent construct – compliance 
The dependent construct in Michael Zürn’s analysis is compliance. He defines compliance by 
using Oran Young’s (in Breitmeier et al 2006:65) definition: “compliance can be said to occur 
when the actual behavior of a given subject conforms to prescribed behavior, and non-
compliance or violation occurs when actual behavior departs significantly from prescribed 
behavior.” It is important to note that compliance refers to the actions and behavior of the 
parties to an agreement, and not to their attitudes and motives (Breitmeier et al 2006:65). 
Furthermore, compliance must be distinguished from both implementation and effectiveness 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:64): Regime implementation concerns questions regarding how a 
regime’s legislative requirements look on paper compared to how they are implemented in 
practice (Breitmeier et al 2006:65). Regime effectiveness refers to a situation where a regime 
successfully fulfills a certain set of functions or solves the problems it was created to solve 
(Underdal 2002:4).  
Zürn emphasizes that non-compliance does not necessarily reflect the unwillingness of actors 
to comply. Violation of a rule can often be the consequence of rule ambiguity (Breitmeier et 
al 2006:65). Here, the author argues in line with similar arguments from management school 
scholars such as Chayes and Chayes (1993). He particularly mentions the problem of rule 
ambiguity – an argument promoted by the management school – in relation to non-
compliance. The ambiguity of a rule makes it more difficult to evaluate objectively whether 
compliance is taking place or not. Zürn terms the issue of treatment of accusations of 
noncompliance the procedural dimension of compliance. However, in his analysis, the 
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substantive dimension of compliance – “the relationship between obligations and actual 
behavior” – represents the dependent construct (Breitmeier et al 2006:66).     
3.2.2 Independent constructs 
Zürn identifies four different independent constructs, which he expects to influence 
compliance: incentives, legalization, legitimacy and responsiveness. The author makes it clear 
that these variables cannot alone make up a comprehensive theory about compliance, but each 
provides valuable insight into how one can cope with compliance problems (Breitmeier 
2006:72).  
Incentives 
The construct “incentives” comprise the use of positive and negative sanctions to induce 
countries to comply with an agreement. It targets countries that “cheat” because the net 
benefit of complying is smaller than the benefit of not complying. The theory assumes that 
actors are unitary and will comply only if the benefits of complying with an agreement exceed 
the costs. In this case, costs and benefits are not limited to money, but also include non-
economic factors like power and prestige (Breitmeier 2006:72,73). Positive and negative 
incentives ought to be designed in such a way as to prevent cheating and free riding by the 
participants. Both positive and negative incentives will influence the actors’ cost-benefit 
considerations. Some regimes entail more threats and punishments than others to ensure the 
credibility of the rules of the regime. However, in general, all rules and regulations that may 
trigger cheating need to be supported by credible threats of punishment in the case of 
noncompliance. There are at least two requirements that should be in place to detect cheating 
and punish the violators. First, verification procedures of regime implementation need to be 
feasible, reliable and affordable. Second, the sanctioning of violators should not be too costly 
for those imposing the sanctions (Breitmeier et al 2006:73, 74). Another crucial condition for 
sanctioning to be effective is that it must be costly for the country being sanctioned. If not, it 
will not change its behavior (Hovi 1998:14). Put simply, sanctioning must be cheap for the 
ones imposing the sanctions and costly for those being sanctioned. Only then can a sanction 
prove effective and change the behavior of the violator.   
Hypothesis 1: Incentives improve compliance rates. 
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Legalization 
The second independent construct in Zürn’s analysis is “legalization”. This perspective targets 
two sources of noncompliance, namely inconsistencies in rule development and application 
and the abuse of ambiguities of a rule. “Legalization” is composed of two aspects: 
internalization and juridification. The first aspect, internalization, originates in international 
law and means that internalization of international laws into national legal systems may lead 
to the international rule or norm receiving full legal status in a country (Breitmeier et al 
2006:82). “It follows that the more a rule is integral to a legal system or, in other words, the 
more an international institution is legalized, the more likely compliance becomes” 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:79). In the United States, for instance, a ratified treaty automatically 
becomes domestic law when it enters into force if it is “self-executing”. A self-executing 
treaty is one that does not need enabling (implementing) legislation. For treaties that do 
require enabling legislation, the enabling legislation (not the original treaty unless 
incorporated into the legislation) becomes domestic law upon its enactment (Bang, Hovi og 
Sprinz, forthcoming:8).   
The second aspect of legalization is juridification. Juridification includes processes that 
ensure clarity, pertinence, stringency, adaptability and consistency (both within the rule itself 
and in relation to other rules) when rules and regulations are designed. This aspect represents 
a possible solution to the problem with rule ambiguity and especially to the problem that 
states abuse rule ambiguity to sneak away from their obligations. In practical terms, 
juridification means the “delegation of … power to develop and interpret rules to bodies 
possessing some degree of autonomy” (Breitmeier et al 2006:83). Such bodies are often 
supranational or transnational courts or other dispute-settlement bodies (Breitmeier et al 
2006:83).   
Hypothesis 2:
Legitimacy 
 Legalization, including both juridification and internalization, improves 
compliance rates. 
The third independent construct in which Zürn expects influence compliance, is “legitimacy.” 
The core of this perspective is the subjective validity of a rule to a country. The degree of 
justice and fairness in the rule-making process and application of rules determines whether a 
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country considers a rule legitimate (Breitmeier et al 2006:91). Fair decision making is key to 
enhancing legitimacy. A decision-making process in which actors are actively engaged and 
where they feel that no decisions are biased in favor of any particular actors or special 
interests consequently produces the most legitimate rule. The theory predicts that enhancing 
the legitimacy of a rule both at the international and at the national level makes compliance 
more likely.    
Hypothesis 3:
Responsiveness 
 Legitimacy improves compliance rates.   
The fourth independent construct presented in the chapter is “responsiveness.” This 
mechanism is a response to “open but involuntary violations … when rules turn out to be 
impractical” [emphasis original] (Breitmeier et al 2006:71). Responsiveness means the 
adjustment of rules if they prove to be impractical to comply with. This has nothing to do with 
the interpretation of a rule nor with its validity. Rather, it has to do with practical issues 
making it difficult for parties to fulfill their obligations (Breitmeier et al 2006:71,72). A 
regime exercising responsiveness is a flexible regime that adapts and adjusts its rules when 
unintentional noncompliance is observed (Breitmeier et al 2006:105).    
Hypothesis 4:
3.3 Operationalization 
 Responsiveness to problems of implementation improves compliance rates. 
3.3.1 Compliance – operational definition  
Variable RC 5: “Does the behavior of important actors generally conform to the provisions of 
the regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence on these developments?” is the 
operational variable measuring compliance in Zürn’s analysis. A country conforms to the 
provisions of the regime if it meets the prescribed requirements of the regime regardless of 
how this is done and what caused the compliant behavior. Furthermore, if a country is 
expected to behave in the same manner regardless of the existence of the regime, the regime 
has no causal impact. If a regime does have causal impact on actors’ behavior, this influence 
may be of a positive or negative character.  
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The first part of variable RC 5 provides seven different answering options:  
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – Behavior exceeds regime requirements. 
2 – Behavior meets regime requirements. 
3 – Behavior conforms with some requirements but not all. 
4 – Behavior conforms some (but not all) of the time and/or to some degree but not 
completely. 
5 – Behavior does not conform at all. 
6 – Don’t know. 
For the second part of the variable, regarding the causal influence of the regime, six 
answering options are provided:  
0 – Not applicable.  
1 – Little or no causal impact.  
2 – Modest causal influence.  
3 – Large causal influence.  
4 – Negative causal influence.  
5 – Don’t know. 
3.3.2 Independent variables – operational definitions     
Incentives 
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To measure the construct “incentives,” Zürn uses three operational variables. The first 
concerns the regime’s compliance mechanisms while the other two concern the regimes’ 
verification procedures.  
RA 47: “What formal compliance mechanisms are provided for in the regime’s constitutive 
provisions to achieve compliance?” There are 12 different answering options, including:  
0 – Not applicable.  
1 – No compliance mechanisms. 
2 – Issuance of notices of violations. 
3 – Suspension of membership rights. 
4 – Exclusion from membership. 
5 – Imposition of military punishments. 
6 – Imposition of financial/economic punishments.  
7 – Support for capacity building to enhance compliance. 
8 – Granting of a transition period to achieve compliance.  
9 – Dissolution of linkages. 
10 – Identify additional compliance mechanisms, if applicable. 
11 – Don’t know. 
Alternatives 3-6 are compliance mechanisms typically associated with the enforcement 
school, whereas alternatives 2 and 7-9 often are associated with the management school.  
To measure the effect of verification procedures, Zürn uses variable RA 45: “Are there 
reporting procedures requiring the submission of information by individual members 
pertaining to regime implementation?” Respondents could choose between the following 
alternatives: 
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0 – Not applicable.  
1 – No.  
2 – Yes.  
3 – Don’t know.  
The second variable measuring verification procedures is RA 46: “Are there procedures for 
reviewing implementation formally or not formally established in the regime’s constitutive 
provisions?” Answering options include: 
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – There are no explicit review procedures. 
2 – Information gathering for broad assessment without evaluating performance/compliance 
of individual parties. 
3 – Information from third parties on implementation by other parties. 
4 – Information gathering for assessment of performance and compliance of individual 
parties. 
5 – Review and broad assessment of the regime by the supreme decision-making body. 
6 – Review and broad assessment of the regime by bodies delegated by parties to make 
decisions or recommendations. 
7 – Review of member performance/compliance by the supreme decision-making body. 
8 – Review of member performance/compliance by bodies delegated by parties to make 
decisions or recommendations. 
9 – Recommendation/implementation of responses to inadequate performance by the supreme 
decision-making body. 
10 – Recommendation/implementation of responses to inadequate performance by bodies 
delegated by parties. 
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11 – On-site inspections to verify compliance. 
12 – Identify additional review procedures, if applicable. 
13 – Don’t know.    
Legalization 
The concept of legalization refers to both internalization and juridification. Zürn explains that 
there are few directly relevant variables available in the data set to measure internalization 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:83). However, one variable with indirect relevance for internalization is 
variable RA 11: “Are the regime’s substantive rules legally binding on the members, or do 
they have the character of soft law (e.g., ministerial declarations, codes of conduct)?” 
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – Rule is legally binding. 
2 – Rule is soft law/not legally binding. 
3 – Don’t know. 
To measure the other component of legalization, juridification, Zürn uses variable RA 29: 
“Did the members of the regime establish a secretariat for the regime as a whole or any of its 
elements?” Possible responses are:  
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – No secretariat established. 
2 – Regime has a secretariat of its own operating independently of other organizations. 
3 – An intergovernmental organization performs the secretariat’s functions. 
4 – A nongovernmental organization performs the secretariat’s functions.  
5 – A nation state performs the secretariat’s functions.  
6 – Don’t know. 
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Variable RA 30 is also used to measure juridification: “How independent is the secretariat 
from the regime’s members?” The answering alternatives are:  
0 – Not applicable (no secretariat exists). 
1 – Highly independent: The secretariat has broad latitude to take action independent of 
member approval. Most of the important actions do not need state approval.  
2 – Strong independence: Between 1 and 3 on the scale.  
3 – Some independence: The secretariat has some latitude to take action with regard to some, 
but not all, important issues. 
4 – Less independent: Between 3 and 5 on the scale.  
5 – No independence: The secretariat has no latitude to take independent action. All action 
taken by the secretariat must have state approval.  
6 – Don’t know. 
Zürn also examines the effect of having autonomous decision-making bodies on compliance 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:87), using variable RA 33: “What decision-making bodies are provided 
for in the regime?”. Answering options include:  
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – Regular meeting of conference of the parties. 
2 – Ad hoc meetings of conference of the parties. 
3 – Standing subsidiary body. 
4 – Ad hoc subsidiary body. 
5 – Don’t know. 
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The final variable measuring juridification is RA 12 “Are the regime’s substantive rules 
generally precise and easy to interpret in the sense that they call for well-defined actions, or 
are they ambiguous and indeterminate?”  
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – Precise and easy to interpret. 
2 – Between 1 and 3 on the scale. 
3 – Medium. 
4 – Between 3 and 5 on the scale. 
5 – Ambiguous and indeterminate. 
6 – Don’t know. 
Legitimacy 
Within the theoretical explanation of the variable “legitimacy,” the aspect of inclusion of 
member states in the decision-making process is captured by variable RF 46: “Were there 
states not participating in the negotiation process that other actors believed should have 
participated?” with possible answering options:  
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – No. 
2 – Yes. 
3 – Don’t know. 
Also covering the aspect of justice by including relevant parties in the negotiations is question 
RF 49: “What roles did non-state actors play in the negotiations?”  including the answering 
options: 
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – Observer role. 
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2 – Member of national delegation. 
3 – Member of negotiation body. 
4 – Exerted pressure inside the negotiations. 
5 – Exerted pressure outside the negotiations. 
6 – Don’t know. 
The third variable measuring legitimacy is variable RF 19: “Were the nations involved in 
regime formation roughly symmetrical in terms of issue-specific power or did the process 
involve sharp differences in power resources?” 
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – Completely even distribution. 
2 – Slightly uneven distribution. 
3 – Considerable unevenness. 
4 – Highly uneven distribution. 
5 – Issue-specific hegemon present. 
Responsiveness 
With regard to the variable “responsiveness,” i.e. how flexible the regime is in responding and 
adjusting to unintentional noncompliance, Zürn chooses variable RA 13: “Does the regime 
have substantive rules that differentiate among its members in terms of requirements, 
prohibitions, or permissions?” Answering alternatives include: 
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – Rule does not differentiate among members. 
2 – Rule differentiates among members. 
3 – Don’t know. 
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To measure the responsiveness aspect, variable RA 47, which asks what compliance 
mechanisms a regime entails, is used again (the variable was also used for “incentives”). The 
most interesting values on this variable, according to Zürn’s theoretical expectations about 
responsiveness, are “7 – support for capacity building to enhance compliance” and “8 – 
granting a transition period to achieve compliance.”  
3.4 Analytical technique 
According to the information and tables provided in the chapter, Zürn performs bivariate 
cross-table analyses. This means that the researcher examines each independent variable’s 
influence on the dependent variable, one at a time, without controlling for other independent 
variables.  
3.5 Summary of results 
The independent construct “incentives” influences compliance positively according to Zürn’s 
results. Incentives have the strongest effect on compliance when the following compliance 
mechanisms are present: suspension of membership rights, exclusion from membership, 
imposition of military punishments and imposition of financial and economic punishments 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:78). These are all negative incentives. Zürn’s analysis shows that the 
use of negative incentives increases compliance levels. It also shows that regimes with such 
negative incentive mechanisms play a causal role in promoting compliance (Breitmeier et al 
2006:78).  
Zürn’s results also show that the use of procedures for implementation reporting influences 
compliance positively. The third operational variable measuring incentives, procedures for 
reviewing implementation, reveals that only strong verification procedures for reviewing 
implementation have a positive effect on compliance levels. The categories 10 – 
recommendation/implementation of responses to inadequate performance by bodies delegated 
by parties and 11 – on-site inspections to verify compliance, have the strongest positive effect 
on compliance levels (Breitmeier et al 2006:78).  
The second variable, “legalization,” is divided into two components: internalization and 
juridification. Zürn finds that the variable measuring the concept of internalization has no 
effect on compliance rates (Breitmeier et al 2006:91). The results from Zürn’s analyses 
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further show that juridification improves compliance rates, but this effect is not strong. The 
variables concerning the existence of a secretariat and the independence of the secretariat 
have only unimportant effects on compliance. The effect of a standing autonomous decision-
making body is positive, but fairly weak, and so is the effect of precise rules. Overall, regimes 
with standing decision-making bodies and precise rules have somewhat higher compliance 
rates than those with ad-hoc decision-making bodies and low rule precision, and the results 
support Zürn’s theoretical expectations about juridification (Breitmeier et al 2006:90).  
The third independent variable, “legitimacy”, concerns the subjective validity of a rule to a 
country. The statistical results show that absence of important actors in these processes 
negatively affects compliance. The probability of high compliance rates increases when all 
important actors participate in the decision making and rule application. The inclusion of non-
state actors in national delegations or in negotiating bodies increases compliance rates 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:103, 104). In other words, compliance improves when all affected 
actors are involved in rule making. Both of these results support Zürn’s hypotheses.  
The fourth and final independent variable, “responsiveness,” does not influence compliance 
as prescribed by the theory. Compliance levels decrease when the regime differentiates 
between actors in terms of requirements, prohibitions and permissions. Zürn also finds that 
capacity building and granting of transition periods negatively affects compliance (Breitmeier 
et al 2006:105).   
3.6 Zürn’s conclusions 
Zürn concludes that there is a clear need for sanctioning and strong, institutionalized 
verification procedures, in order to induce compliance. “… efforts to promote compliance 
through negotiations and various forms of capacity building are not sufficient to induce 
compliance with international rules and regulations” (Breitmeier et al 2006:110). The results 
of his analyses show that regimes with sanctioning mechanisms (negative incentives) and 
strong verification procedures for implementation have higher compliance levels. Zürn 
suggests a more comprehensive view on compliance, including incentives, institutional 
design, the rule of law and the power of legitimacy (Breitmeier et al 2006:110).  
3.7 Summary 
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In this chapter, I have presented Michael Zürn’s analysis of horizontal compliance 
mechanisms and compliance. More specifically, I have provided information about the data in 
Zürn’s analysis, the constructs and variables, the analytical technique, the results, and his 
conclusions. In the next chapter I present Young’s analysis in a similar manner. 
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4 Oran Young’s Analysis 
In this chapter I present Oran Young’s analysis of the effect of compliance mechanisms on 
regime effectiveness. An account of this is a necessary to identify differences Young and 
Zürn’s analyses, in order to answer the question of why they  reach differing conclusions. In 
section 4.1, I present information about the data. In section 4.2 I provide information about 
the constructs. Section 4.3 includes Young’s operationalization and variables. In section 4.4 I 
provide an account of the analytical technique. In section 4.5, I present Young’s results, and 
section 4.6 includes his conclusions. Section 4.7 is a brief summary of the chapter.  
4.1 Data 
Young uses the same database as Michael Zürn, the International Regimes Database (IRD) in 
his analyses.  
4.2 Constructs 
4.2.1 Dependent construct – regime effectiveness  
In Young’s chapter, there is not much information about the theoretical construct of regime 
effectiveness. Rather, Young focuses largely on the operational definition of the construct. In 
his analyses regime effectiveness is treated “both as the attainment of goals and as progress 
toward solving the problems leading to [the regimes’] … creation” (Breitmeier et al 
2006:114). He specifies that goal attainment on its own is not a sufficient indicator of regime 
effectiveness. Goals can be quite modest, and can be fulfilled without it having any effect on 
the underlying problem. Problem solving is a necessary  complementary indicator of regime 
effectiveness, therefore (Breitmeier et al 2006:131).   
4.2.2 Independent constructs 
Young uses two independent constructs in his analyses: the nature of the compliance 
mechanisms (what compliance mechanisms a regime occupies), and the theoretical approach 
to compliance (management or enforcement). He then presents four different variable 
combinations, or queries (Breitmeier et al 2006:157):  
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1. Are there clearcut links between the nature of the compliance mechanisms provided and 
goal attainment?  
2. Are there discernible patterns in the connections between the nature of the compliance 
mechanisms provided and problem change?  
3. Are there connections between the approach to compliance chosen and goal attainment?  
4. Are there links between the approach to compliance chosen and problem change?  
In these queries, the expected findings are not explicit. Young does not specify what he 
expects to find, but rather states what proponents of the different theoretical schools will 
expect to find with regard to “the success of the … regimes” (Breitmeier et al 2006:156). 
Based on these schools’ expectations, I formulate six concrete hypotheses: 
1. Mechanisms capable of generating rewards and penalties improve compliance rates. 
2. Mechanisms capable of generating rewards and penalties improve regime 
effectiveness. 
3. Operation of compliance mechanisms, but not necessarily the use of penalties and 
rewards, increases compliance rates. 
4. Operation of compliance mechanisms, but not necessarily the use of penalties and 
rewards, improves regime effectiveness.  
5. There is no clearcut relationship between compliance mechanisms and compliance 
rates.  
6. There is no clearcut relationship between compliance mechanisms and regime 
effectiveness. 
4.3 Operationalization 
4.3.1 Dependent variables – goal attainment and problem change 
To measure “regime effectiveness”, Young has chosen two operational variables: goal 
attainment and problem change. The first variable is goal attainment: Variable RC 10: “If the 
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regime has stated goals, indicate whether the behavioral changes led to the fulfillment of the 
stated goals of the regime.” Answering alternatives include: 
0 – Not applicable (No goals). 
1 – No (Goals not fulfilled). 
2 – Yes (Goals fulfilled). 
3 – Don’t know. 
The follow-up question is: “For each stated goal coded under GOALS_FULFILL, indicate 
what causal impact the regime had on this development”: 
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – Little or no causal impact. 
2 – Modest causal influence. 
3 – Large causal influence. 
4 – Negative causal influence. 
5 – Don’t know. 
The second variable measuring the construct of regime effectiveness is problem change: 
Variable RC 11 “For each problem listed under PROBLEM, indicate whether and how the 
state of the world changed during this period with respect to the problem”. Possible answering 
options are:  
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – The problem worsened considerably. 
2 – The problem worsened slightly. 
3 – The problem stayed the same. 
4 – The problem improved slightly. 
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5 – The problem improved considerably. 
6 – Don’t know. 
Following this question as well is a follow-up question regarding the causality of the regime: 
For each problem coded under PROBLEM_CHANGE indicate whether the regime exerted a 
causal influence on the change of the world with regard to the problem”: 
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – Little or no causal impact. 
2 – Modest causal influence. 
3 – Balanced causal influence. 
4 – Significant causal influence. 
5 – Very strong causal influence. 
6 – Don’t know. 
4.3.2 Independent variables – operational definitions 
To measure the independent construct “nature of compliance mechanisms”, Young uses 
variable RA 47: “What formal compliance mechanisms are provided for in the regime’s 
constitutive provisions to achieve compliance?” (Breitmeier et al 2006:156). Both Zürn and 
Young include this variable in their analyses. There are twelve different answering options, 
including four compliance mechanisms which are usually linked to the enforcement school 
(3-6), and four mechanisms typically associated with the management school (2 and 7-9). 
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – No compliance mechanisms. 
2 – Issuance of notices of violations. 
3 – Suspension of membership rights. 
4 – Exclusion from membership. 
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5 – Imposition of military punishments. 
6 – Imposition of financial/economic punishments. 
7 – Support for capacity building to enhance compliance. 
8 – Granting of a transition period to achieve compliance. 
9 – Dissolution of linkages. 
10 – Identify additional compliance mechanisms, if applicable. 
11 – Don’t know. 
The second independent construct, “theoretical approach to compliance”, is operationalized 
by variable RA 49: “Do these [compliance] procedures generally reflect an enforcement 
approach or a management approach to compliance?” (Breitmeier et al 2006:157). Answering 
options include: 
0 – Not applicable. 
1 – Enforcement approach. 
2 – Management approach. 
3 – Don’t know. 
4.4 Analytical technique 
Young uses bivariate cross-table analysis in his research. This is the same technique as 
Michael Zürn uses in his analysis.  
4.5 Summary of results 
Young finds that the compliance mechanisms “capacity building” and “notices of violation” 
have the greatest positive effect on goal attainment. More specifically, “goal attainment 
occurred in 89.2 percent of the cases featuring capacity building” (Breitmeier et al 2006:158). 
In the cases where the use of capacity building led to goal attainment, the regime had a large 
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causal impact on this in 83.6 percent of the cases, according to Young’s results. Almost 
exactly the same numbers also count for the value “issuance of notices of violation” (90.8 and 
81.1 percent, respectively) (Breitmeier et al 2006:158, 161). Overall, Young finds that 
compliance mechanisms associated with the management school have the strongest positive 
effect on goal attainment.   
The results for the relationship between compliance mechanisms and the other dependent 
variable, problem change, are similar to the ones presented for goal attainment. Here, Young 
finds that having no compliance mechanisms actually leads to considerable improvement in 
the problem in 20.6 percent of the cases (Breitmeier et al 2006:159). But according to his 
results, no compliance mechanisms actually lead to a worsening of the problem in 23.3 
percent of the cases (Breitmeier et al 2006:164). The compliance mechanisms “issuance of 
notices of violation” and “capacity building” again prove to have strong positive effects on 
problem change. Capacity building has the strongest effect: In those regimes with capacity 
building mechanisms, there was slight improvement in the problem in 43.9 percent of the 
cases, and considerable improvement in the problem in 22 percent of the cases (Breitmeier et 
al 2006:182).  
A univariate analysis of the independent variable concerning approach to compliance reveals 
that in 94.1 percent of the cases, the management school is dominant. Based on this, Young 
states that: “Those who create and administer international regimes exhibit an overwhelming 
preference for procedures featuring management in contrast to enforcement” (Breitmeier et al 
2006:186). His results for the analysis of  “approach to compliance” on goal attainment show 
that 86.1 of the regimes that associate themselves with the management school attain their 
goals. Out of the regimes that associate themselves with the enforcement school (5.94 
percent), 54.17 percent attain their goals. In both instances, the causal influence of the regime 
is strong (Breitmeier et al 2006:186).  
The results from the analysis of the effect of “approach to compliance” on problem change 
show that 26.9 percent of the regimes associated with the management school (89.4 percent) 
have experienced considerable improvement in the problem. The regime had a very strong 
causal impact on this improvement in just over 15 percent of the cases. 33.33 percent of the 
regimes associated with the enforcement school (10.57 percent) noted a considerable 
improvement in the problem. The regime did not have a strong causal influence on this 
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improvement, but a significant causal role in 60 percent of the cases (Breitmeier et al 
2006:186).  
4.6 Young’s conclusions 
Young concludes that international environmental regimes can make a difference regardless 
of coercive capacity: “Overall, the data from the IRD suggest that regimes can make a 
difference, even when they lack the coercive capacity we often assume is needed to produce 
effective governance” (Breitmeier et al 2006:186). He concludes that “the evidence we have 
presented in this chapter suggests that there is no reason to dismiss international regimes 
because of their … tendency to avoid familiar enforcement mechanisms” (Breitmeier et al 
2006:190).  
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, I have presented information about data, constructs and variables, analytical 
technique, results, and conclusions from Young’s analyses of regime effectiveness. In the 
next chapter, I compare Young and Zürn’s analyses.   
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5 Comparison of the two analyses 
Why do Michael Zürn and Oran Young reach different conclusions with regard to the 
relationship between enforcement and compliance? To answer this question, a thorough 
comparison of the two analyses is necessary. In this chapter, I identify similarities and 
differences between Young and Zürn’s analyses in order to explain their different 
conclusions. In section 5.1, I provide an account of the two dimensions on which the analyses 
are identical: Data and analytical technique. In section 5.2, I present the dimensions on which 
the analyses differ: Dependent construct, independent constructs, operationalization, 
theoretical approaches, research question, validity and interpretations of results. These 
dimensions are the ones of greatest interest in order to answer my research question. In 
section 5.3 I summarize my findings. 
5.1 Similarities 
The analyses of Young and Zürn are identical on two accounts: Data and analytical technique. 
This could, in theory, lead to similar research results, but only if the researchers also choose at 
least some of the same variables from the dataset.  
5.1.1 Data 
Young and Zürn use the same empirical data, the IRD, in their analyses. This implies that 
their choice of units of analysis, or regime components, cannot explain that their conclusions 
differ.  
5.1.2 Analytical technique 
Both Young and Zürn use bivariate crosstable analysis to examine the data from the IRD. On 
this dimension, their analyses are identical. Differences in analytical technique, therefore, 
cannot explain the different conclusions.   
5.2 Differences 
Dependent construct, independent constructs, operationalization, theoretical approach, 
research question, questions concerning validity and interpretation of results differ between 
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Young and Zürn’s analyses. Some of these aspects, therefore, are likely the cause of the 
differing conclusions.   
5.2.1 Dependent construct 
The dependent construct in Zürn’s analysis is compliance while the dependent construct in 
Young’s analysis is regime effectiveness. These are two different constructs. Compliance 
occurs when subjects to an agreement act in accordance with the behavior prescribed by the 
regime (Breitmeier et al 2006:65). Regime effectiveness, according to Underdal (2002:4), 
describes a situation where a regime successfully performs the functions it was created to 
perform and/or solves the problems it was created to solve. The two constructs are, however, 
closely linked, since compliance is a necessary component of regime effectiveness. In order 
for a regime to be effective, high compliance rates are necessary, but not sufficient. Broad 
participation and deep commitments are the other two components necessary for a regime to 
be effective, according to Barrett (2008:242, 243).  
5.2.2 Independent constructs 
Zürn’s analyses include four different independent constructs which he expects to influence 
compliance: “Incentives,” “legalization,” “legitimacy” and “responsiveness.”  
To explain the variance in the dependent constructs of goal attainment and problem change, 
Young uses two independent constructs: the nature of compliance mechanisms (what 
compliance mechanisms a regime occupies) and on which theoretical approach to compliance 
(enforcement or management) a regime builds its compliance system. These two independent 
constructs concern compliance, one of the aspects of regime effectiveness. The two other 
components of regime effectiveness, participation and commitments, according to Barrett 
(2008:242, 243), are not taken into account. It is unlikely that two independent variables 
mainly concerning compliance (“nature of compliance mechanisms” and “approach to 
compliance”) are sufficient to explain most of the variance in regime effectiveness (goal 
attainment and problem change). More independent variables will likely be needed. 
Young’s second independent construct, approach to compliance, also concerns compliance, 
since the enforcement school and the management school are theoretical approaches to 
compliance. Towards the end of the chapter, Young concludes that “[t]his evidence suggests 
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that there are good reasons for selecting a management approach over an enforcement 
approach [to compliance], at least when the problem at hand is environmental in character” 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:186). Based on the focus on compliance in Young’s analysis, it seems 
fair to say that Young and Zürn study similar constructs to some extent.  
5.2.3 Operationalization 
Although I claim that the constructs in the analyses of Young and Zürn are related, their 
operational variables are different. Young uses two operational variables to measure his 
dependent construct of regime effectiveness, namely goal attainment and problem change. 
Zürn uses only one operational variable to measure his dependent construct of compliance, 
namely conformity with regime provisions. Both Young and Zürn also examine the causal 
impact of the regime on goal attainment and problem change, and conformity, respectively.   
Young and Zürn choose different operational independent variables. However, one 
independent variable is the same: RA 47 Compliance mechanisms. This variable proves to be 
a central explanatory variable, both for compliance and regime effectiveness, in the 
multivariate statistical analysis in chapter 6 of my thesis. The fact that Young and Zürn use 
the same independent variable does not imply that they will get the same results. After all, 
their dependent variables are different. But it is an indication that their results should be 
somewhat similar and that perhaps different interpretations of the results is a possible cause of 
the different conclusions.     
5.2.4 Theoretical approaches 
The enforcement school and the management school are theoretical approaches to 
compliance. Both Young and Zürn present the views of these two schools in their analyses. In 
his the conclusion, Zürn supports a majority of the views of the enforcement school, while 
Young largely supports and encourages the use of compliance mechanisms associated with 
the management school. Could it be the case that the two authors have different 
preconceptions about what theoretical approach is the better one, and that this has “colored” 
their conclusions? According to their theoretical expectations, it is not obvious that they favor 
one theoretical school over another. Both Young and Zürn give a fairly objective description 
of the theoretical approaches to compliance.  
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But it is striking that when summarizing their results, Young chooses to focus almost solely 
on the results favoring the management school while Zürn has a clear focus on the results 
favorable to the enforcement school. I come back to this point later, in subsection 5.2.7 
Interpretation of results. 
5.2.5 Research question 
The two authors’ research questions differ. Zürn examines horizontal mechanisms for 
inducing compliance and their effect on compliance rates.  
Young considers whether “regimes are largely epiphenomena incapable of operating 
effectively as sources of governance under any but the most limited of circumstances” 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:113). He aims to answer this question by examining (a) the effect of 
decision rules and (b) the effect of compliance mechanisms on regime effectiveness. The 
analysis of compliance mechanisms on regime effectiveness is the one considered in this 
thesis.  
5.2.6 Validity 
There are at least three kinds of validity. Construct validity concerns the extent to which the 
constructs of theoretical interest are successfully measured by the operational variables 
(Hoyle, Judd and Harris 2002:33). Internal validity concerns the extent to which one can draw 
“causal conclusions about the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable” 
(Hoyle, Judd and Harris 2002:33). External validity concerns the extent to which one can 
generalize the research results from the sample to the population (Hoyle, Judd and Harris 
2002:33). For the purpose of this thesis, examining construct validity of the research of 
Young and Zürn is the most fruitful.   
Construct validity 
If the observed variables do not have construct validity, there is no way the research can inform our 
theory. Even worse, poor construct validity can actually mislead researchers by yielding seemingly 
positive results that in actuality do not reflect the constructs of interest (Hoyle, Judd and Harris 
2002:35). 
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The quote above explains the consequences that can follow from low construct validity. The 
construct validity of a piece of research is “the degree to which both the independent and the 
dependent variables accurately reflect or measure the constructs of interest” (Hoyle, Judd and 
Harris 2002:32). The figure below illustrates this. The grey area represents the construct 
validity, and should be as large as possible to increase the validity of the research. 
Alternatively, one could use multiple operational variables, in order to capture a larger portion 
of the construct. 
 
Figure 5.1 
Young’s variables 
When Young introduces his research question, regime effectiveness is only briefly explained 
as consisting of attainment of goals and “progress toward solving the problems” that led to the 
regime’s creation (Breitmeier et al 2006:114). On at least one more occasion later in the 
chapter, he touches on the definition again, but without explicitly defining regime 
effectivness: “… alternative decision rules will influence the behavior of various actors and 
ultimately contribute to solving the problems that gave rise to regime formation” (Breitmeier 
et al 2006:122). The last part of this quote, “solving the problems that gave rise to regime 
formation,” is very similar to Underdal’s (2002) definition of regime effectiveness. The 
problem, therefore, is not that regime effectiveness is not discussed but rather that it is never 
explicitly defined. Hoyle, Judd and Harris (2002:79) write that: “… measurement always 
presupposes a prior clearly defined construct.” This clear definition of the construct to be 
measured, should further guide the researcher in the choice of operational definitions in order 
to measure the variance in the dependent variable as accurately as possible (Hoyle, Judd and 
Harris 2002:79). Without a clear starting point for the analysis, it is difficult to judge whether 
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Young has chosen good operationalizations of the construct and thereby difficult to determine 
the construct validity. 
What I refer to as independent constructs in Young’s analysis, are not really constructs. A 
construct is an abstraction “that social scientists discuss in their theories” (Hoyle, Judd and 
Harris 2002:75). Constructs cannot be measured directly but require that the researcher finds 
“concrete representations that approximate what we mean when we speak of such concepts” 
(Hoyle, Judd and Harris 2002:75). In Young’s analyses, the independent variables “nature of 
compliance mechanisms” and “approach to enforcement” are operational variables (RA 47 
and RA 49 respectively) rather than abstractions derived from theory. It is therefore less 
relevant to talk about construct validity of Young’s independent variables. 
Zürn’s variables 
The operational variable “Conformity with regime provisions” covers large parts of the 
construct of compliance. “Compliance can be said to occur when the actual behavior of a 
given subject conforms to prescribed behavior” (Breitmeier et al 2006:65) is a theoretical 
definition of compliance. Variable RC 5 in the IRD arguably overlaps largely with the 
theoretical definition: “Does the behavior of important actors generally conform to the 
provisions of the regime? Did the regime exert a causal influence on these developments?” It 
is reasonable that Zürn measures what he actually wants to measure when he uses variable RC 
5 as the operational variable for compliance. In other words, the construct validity is high.  
Zürn recognizes that the operational variables available in the IRD are insufficient to measure 
some of his independent constructs. For instance, Zürn finds no good indicators of the 
construct “internalization,” but uses an indicator not directly relevant for measuring 
internalization of international law into national legal systems: RA 11 – “Are the regime’s 
substantive rules legally binding on the members, or do they have the character of soft law 
(e.g. ministerial declarations, codes of conduct)?” Choosing indicators likely to explain only a 
small part of the variance in the dependent variable decreases construct validity because the 
chosen variables measure other constructs than what the researcher is interested in measuring.   
5.2.7 Interpretation of results 
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In addition to reading the interpretations and conclusions written by Young and Zürn in their 
respective chapters, it is interesting to take a closer look at the tables with the bivariate 
analyses, also included in their chapters. In order to identify possible differences between 
Zürn and Young’s interpretations of the results, I choose to take a closer look at variable RA 
47 used by both researchers.  
Zürn has grouped the results for the values 0-2 and 7-11 together4. These values represent 
either no compliance mechanisms or mechanisms associated with the management school. 
The remaining values (3-6)5
                                                 
4 0 – not applicable, 1 – no compliance mechanisms, 2 – issuance of notices of violation, 7 – support for capacity 
building to enhance compliance, 8 – granting of a transition period to achieve compliance, 9 – dissolution of 
linkages, 10 – additional compliance mechanisms, 11 – don’t know  
, the ones associated with the enforcement school, are individual 
categories in the table. It seems natural to ask why Zürn has grouped the management school 
mechanisms together, and why he has put them together with the values that represent no 
compliance mechanisms. Is he more interested in the results for the individual enforcement 
school mechanisms than the individual management school mechanisms? Judging from the 
focus on the results associated with the enforcement school mechanisms in his comments of 
the results, the answer to this question is yes. The comments of the results are mainly 
concerned with the strong positive results of negative compliance mechanisms (i.e. values 3-
6) on compliance levels, despite the fact that the statistical results for the management school 
mechanisms are equally convincing. It is interesting to take a closer look at the results in the 
table:    
5 3 – suspension of membership rights, 4 – exclusion from membership, 5 – imposition of military punishments, 
6 – imposition of financial/economic punishments 
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Table 5.1  
 (Breitmeier et al 2002:80). 
Table 5.1 from Zürn’s analysis of the effect of compliance mechanisms on conformity shows 
that: 
• Few regimes make use of enforcement school mechanisms. 
• A majority of the regimes make use of management school mechanisms. 
• The behavior of 42.9 percent of the member states in regimes with the compliance 
mechanism “suspension of membership rights” (value 3 on the compliance mechanism 
variable) exceeds the regime requirements (value 1 on the conformity variable). 
Another 42.9 percent of the member states in regimes with value 3 behave in a way 
that meets regime requirements. These are impressive numbers. But because of the 
small number of regimes using enforcement school mechanisms, these 85.8 percent 
represent only 6 regimes. Such a low number of units could mean that the results are 
not very robust.  
• The behavior of 46.7 percent of the member states in regimes with values 0-2 or 7-11 
(no compliance mechanisms or management school mechanisms) meets regime 
51 
 
requirements (value 2 on the conformity variable). Another 17.2 percent of the 
member states behave in a way that exceeds regime requirements (value 1). Together, 
these two percentages represent 108 regimes, and this fact makes the evidence for the 
values 0-2 and 7-11 more robust. Still, Zürn does not comment on these numbers. 
Zürn is more interested in the mechanisms related to what he calls real enforcement. He 
writes this explicitly in his comments to the results. For the construct “incentives,” 
operationalized by the variable in question (RA 47), he concludes that: “the presence of such 
mechanisms increases both compliance rates and the causal roles regimes play in promoting 
compliance” (Breitmeier et al 2006:78), referring to the compliance mechanisms with values 
3-6.  
When commenting on the results for RA 47 compliance mechanisms’ effect on goal 
attainment and problem change, Young chooses to comment only on the most robust results. 
These are the results for the category “no compliance mechanisms” and the results for typical 
management school mechanisms: capacity building, notices of violation and granting of a 
transition period. Although only 18 regime elements (5.68 percent) possess the compliance 
mechanism “imposition of financial/economic punishments,” all of these fulfill their goals 
(100 percent). The results for this mechanism are convincing but are left uncommented, 
probably due to the small numbers of regimes using this mechanism.  
The results of the independent variable RA 47 compliance mechanisms on conformity, goal 
attainment and problem change are fairly similar. Compliance mechanisms associated with 
the management school are more frequently used by regimes than compliance mechanisms 
associated with the enforcement school. The compliance mechanisms associated with the 
management school positively effect conformity, goal attainment and problem change to a 
large extent, but so do the compliance mechanisms associated with the enforcement school. 
The biggest difference is that the results for the enforcement school compliance mechanisms 
are less robust than the results for management school compliance mechanisms because 
relatively few regimes use them. Because of the similar results of this variable in both Young 
and Zürn’s analyses, one would expect that their comments on and interpretations of these 
results also would be similar. But they are not. While Zürn chooses to focus largely on 
interpreting the results for the enforcement school compliance mechanisms, Young focuses 
mostly on the results for the management school compliance mechanisms. This could be a 
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contributing factor to their different conclusions although this evaluation of interpretation of 
results only concerns one independent variable.    
5.3 Summary 
My examination of Young and Zürn’s analyses in this chapter indicates that their differing 
conclusions have something to do with operationalization, validity and interpretation of 
results. However, it is not easy to pinpoint what the exact relationship between these factors 
and the differing conclusions is. The examination suggests two causes of the differing 
conclusions: First, higher construct validity could perhaps have led to more similar results and 
possibly more similar conclusions. The examination indicates that the construct validity of 
Zürn’s analysis is lower than desirable due to the operationalizations of some of the 
independent variables. It is difficult to determine the construct validity of Young’s analysis 
because of a lack of an explicit definition of regime effectiveness. Second, different 
interpretations of results might contribute to the differing conclusions. In their interpretations 
of the results Young tends to focus on the results associated with the management school, 
while Zürn focuses on results associated with the enforcement school. 
My qualitative examination of the similarities and differences in the analyses of Young and 
Zürn has not led to any clear findings with regard to the research question. In the next chapter, 
I use quantitative techniques to analyze data from the IRD in order to find clearer answers to 
my research question.    
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6 A multivariate analysis of 
compliance and regime effectiveness 
The examination of differences and similarities between the analyses of Oran Young and 
Michael Zürn in Chapter 6 provided some answers to my research question. The purpose of 
this chapter is to identify additional reasons for why the authors have reached different 
conclusions, this time through multivariate statistical analysis. By using multivariate 
statistical techniques to analyze the variables from the IRD previously investigated by Young 
and Zürn, it might be possible to find more precise answers to my research question. I 
transferred the data I use in my analyses (parts of IRD) from Microsoft Access via Excel to 
SPSS to make use of multivariate statistical techniques. In section 6.1, I justify my choice of 
multivariate analysis. In section 6.2, I provide an account of Young and Zürn’s hypotheses. In 
section 6.3, I present my six analyses of Young and Zürn’s dependent variables. In section 
6.4, I discuss the results from my analyses, and in section 6.5 I summarize my findings.  
6.1 Multivariate statistical analysis 
Using bivariate techniques to analyze data provides the researcher with valuable information 
about the effect of variable X on variable Y. But a simple bivariate model is seldom sufficient 
to explain variance in the dependent variable. Through multivariate analyses of the variables 
used by Young and Zürn I aim to (i) explain more of the variance in the dependent variable, 
(ii) find more robust results by controlling for other independent variables when analyzing 
one independent variable’s effect on a dependent variable, and (iii) find out which 
independent variables affect which dependent variables, and which independent variables 
have no effects at all. This third point is particularly interesting because the dependent 
variables of compliance and regime effectiveness are different but closely related concepts.   
6.2 Hypotheses 
6.2.1 Zürn’s hypotheses 
Zürn provides four hypotheses that concern the outcome of his analyses: 
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1. Incentives improve compliance rates. 
The incentives perspective includes positive and negative sanctions, verification of 
implementation and review of implementation. The operational variables measuring this 
perspective are RA 47 Compliance mechanisms, RA 45 Reporting procedures and RA 46 
Implementation review (Breitmeier et al 2006:72-78).  
2. Legalization improves compliance rates. 
a. Juridification improves compliance rates. 
Juridification particularly focuses on the preciseness and clarity of rules. The operational 
variables measuring juridification are RA 12 Preciseness of rules, RA 29 Secretariat 
establishment, RA 30 Secretariat independence, and RA 33 Decision making bodies 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:83-90). 
b. Internalization improves compliance rates. 
Internalization of rules means to incorporate regulations into existing rule-of-law systems. 
The operational variable measuring internalization is RA 11 Legally binding (Breitmeier et al 
2006:90-91).  
3. Legitimacy improves compliance rates. 
Legitimacy includes the importance of legitimate, fair and just rules, as well as fairness and 
justice in the making of these rules. The operational variables measuring legitimacy are RF 46 
States participating, RF 49 Non-state actors, and RF 19 Issue-area specific power (Breitmeier 
et al 2006:91, 96-103).   
4. Responsiveness to problems of implementation improves compliance rates.  
Responsiveness to problems of implementation focuses on the resources available for the 
parties to implement rules and the flexibility of the compliance-management system “to adapt 
or adjust to new problems” (Breitmeier et al 2006:105). The operational variables measuring 
responsiveness are RA 13 Rule differentiation and RA 47 Compliance mechanisms 
(Breitmeier et al 2006:105-108). 
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6.2.2 Young’s hypotheses 
Young does not provide explicit hypotheses concerning what he expects to find in his 
analyses. However, based on the theoretical reasoning in Young’s chapter, I formulate six  
concrete hypotheses: 
1. Mechanisms capable of generating rewards and penalties improve compliance rates. 
2. Mechanisms capable of generating rewards and penalties improve regime 
effectiveness. 
3. Operation of compliance mechanisms, but not necessarily the use of penalties and 
rewards, increases compliance rates. 
4. Operation of compliance mechanisms, but not necessarily the use of penalties and 
rewards, improves regime effectiveness.  
5. There is no clearcut relationship between compliance mechanisms and compliance 
rates.  
6. There is no clearcut relationship between compliance mechanisms and regime 
effectiveness. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are associated with those who support the enforcement school. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are associated with those who support the management school. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 are associated with those who support the social-practice perspective.  
6.2.3 My general expectations 
At the outset, I expect the findings of Zürn and Young to be confirmed by my six analyses. 
However, it is likely that I will get different results to some extent because of the use of 
multivariate analysis (adding all independent variables at the same time and estimating 
controlled effects).  
I expect Zürn’s independent variables to have the greatest effects on Zürn’s dependent 
variables, and Young’s independent variables to have the greatest effects on Young’s 
dependent variables. Because Young’s independent variables both relate to the concept of 
compliance, I also expect to find that Young’s independent variables significantly affect 
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Zürn’s dependent variable, compliance. If Young’s independent variables have moderate to 
strong effects on compliance, it would support my expectation. It would also reinforce 
Young’s conclusions and make them more convincing and relevant for the compliance 
debate.   
6.3 The analyses 
I analyze a total of six dependent variables. First, I analyze the dependent variables used by  
Zürn, conformity and conformity causal: 
• RC 5 Conformity: “Does the behavior of important actors generally conform to the 
provisions of the regime?”  
• RC 5 Conformity causal: “Did the regime exert a causal influence on these 
developments?” 
Second, I analyze the first couple of dependent variables used by Young, goal attainment and 
goal attainment causal: 
• RC 10 Goal attainment: “Taken together, did the behavioral changes lead to the 
fulfillment of the stated and/or unstated goals of the regime?” 
• RC 10 Goal attainment causal: “What causal impact did the regime have in producing 
these changes?” 
Third, I analyze the other pair of dependent variables used by Young, problem change and 
problem change causal:  
• RC 11 Problem change: “How did the state of the world change during this period 
with respect to the problems addressed by the regime?” 
• RC 11 Problem change causal: “Did the regime exert a causal influence on these 
developments?” 
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I include all ten independent variables in my six analyses, both the ones used by Zürn in his 
analyses and the ones used by Young in his analyses6
• RA 11 Legally binding rules: “Are the regime’s substantive rules legally binding on 
the members, or do they have the character of soft law (e.g. ministerial declarations, 
codes of conduct)?” 
. These include:  
• RA 12 Preciseness of rules: “Are the regime’s substantive rules generally precise and 
easy to interpret in the sense that they call for well-defined actions, or are they 
ambiguous and indeterminate?” 
• RA 13 Rule differentiation: “Does the regime have substantive rules that differentiate 
among its members in terms of requirements, prohibitions, or permissions?” 
• RA 30 Secretariat independence: “How independent is the secretariat from the 
regime’s members?” 
• RA 33 Decision-making bodies: “What decision-making bodies are provided for in the 
regime?” 
• RA 45 Reporting procedures: “Are there reporting procedures requiring the 
submission of information by individual members pertaining to regime 
implementation?”  
• RA 46 Implementation review: “Are there procedures for reviewing implementation 
formally or not formally established in the regime’s constitutive provisions?” 
• RA 47 Compliance mechanisms: “What formal compliance mechanisms are provided 
for in the regime’s constitutive provisions to achieve compliance?” 
• RA 49 Compliance approach: “Do these procedures generally reflect an enforcement 
approach or a management approach to compliance?” 
                                                 
6 All of Young’s and Zürn’s independent variables are included except for RA 29: ”Did the members of the 
regime establish a secretariat for the regime as a whole or any of its elements?” and RF 46: ”Were there states 
not participating in the negotiation process that other actors believed should have participated?”. These two 
variables were not found in the Microsoft Access document with the IRD.  
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• RF 19 Symmetrical power: “Were the nations involved in regime formation roughly 
symmetrical in terms of issue-specific power or did the process involve sharp 
differences in power resources?”  
• RF 49 Non-state actors: “What roles did non-state actors play in the negotiations?” 
Young uses the variables RA 47 and RA 49 in his analysis. Zürn uses the remaining variables, 
RA 11, RA 12, RA 13, RA 30, RA 33, RA 45, RA 46, RF 19 and RF 49. Both Zürn and 
Young use variable RA 47. I have adjusted all ten independent variables according to the 
formal requirements for analyzing them using regression7
6.3.1 Excluded variables 
. I analyze the six dependent 
variables sequentially. This means that in each analysis, I add the independent variables RA49 
Compliance approach and RA 47 Compliance mechanisms (Young’s independent variables, 
including the variable in which both Young and Zürn uses, RA 47) in model 1 of the analysis, 
while I add the remaining independent variables (Zürn’s independent variables) in model 2 of 
the analysis.   
Preliminary analyses of the dependent variables show that the variables RA 12 Preciseness of 
rules, RA 46 Implementation review and RF 19 Symmetrical power contribute to high 
multicolinearity. I therefore exclude these from all six analyses.  
The dummy variables RA 30_5 Secretariat independence – High, RA 47_4 Exclusion from 
membership, and RA 47_9 Dissolution of linkages are constants, and SPSS excludes them 
from the analyses.   
6.3.2 Analyzing ordinal dependent variables 
Five of the six dependent variables to be analyzed are ordinal-level variables8
                                                 
7 Nominal and ordinal variables are recoded into dummy variables. The values “Not applicable” and “Don’t 
know” are user-defined as missing because they are of low interest for the analysis. Furthermore, the units coded 
by Kate O’Neill have high missing values, and are therefore excluded from the analysis.  
. Using linear 
regression (Ordinary Least Square, OLS) formally requires that all variables are at least at 
8 RC 5 Conformity, RC 5 Conformity causal, RC 10 Goal attainment causal, RC 11 Problem change and RC 11 
Problem change causal are ordinal-level variables when the categories 0 (Not applicable) and 5 (Don’t know) are 
defined as missing. RC 10 Goal attainment is a dichotomous variable when values 0 and 5 are defined as 
missing.  
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interval scale. There are at least three possible ways to analyze an ordinal dependent variable 
in regression analysis (Halpin 2003 URL; Torra et al 2006:467):  
a) Treat the variable as numerical and use regular OLS   
b) Dichotomize the variable and use binary logistic regression 
c) Use ordinal logistic regression, if one can argue that the ordinal variable represents 
measurements of an underlying continuous variable.  
Alternative a), treating the variable as a numerical (continuous) variable is an “easy and 
common choice” (Torra et al 2006:467). According to Torra et al (2006:467) this alternative 
is reasonable if the dependent variable has a minimum of five categories. In my analyses, I 
treat the dependent variables RC5 Conformity, RC11 Problem change, and RC11 Problem 
change causal, as interval variables and analyze them using regular linear regression (OLS). 
These variables fulfill the requirement of having at least five categories. Some authors would 
argue that choosing to treat ordinal variables as continuous variables is problematic: “Hawkes 
(1971), Morris (1970), O’Brien (1982), Reynolds (1973), Somers (1974), and Smith (1974), 
among others, suggest that the biases in using continuous-variable methods for ordinal 
variables are large and that special techniques for ordinal variables are required” (Winship 
and Mare 1984:512). Other authors disagree and argue that the benefits of treating the ordinal 
dependent variable as continuous are larger than the drawbacks: “Allan (1976), Borgatta 
(1968), Kim (1975, 1978), Labowitz (1967, 1970), and O’Brien (1979a), among others, claim 
that multivariate methods for interval-level variables should be used for ordinal variables 
because the power and flexibility gained from these methods outweigh the small biases that 
they may entail” (Winship and Mare 1984:512).   
Alternative b), dichotomizing the variables is a possible alternative for the ordinal variables 
with less than five categories. In order to preserve as much of the information in the 
independent variables as possible, however, I choose not to dichotomize the variables which 
possess less than five categories. To analyze the dependent variables RC 5 Conformity causal 
and RC 10 Goal attainment causal, I could have included both value 4 (Negative causal 
influence), by recoding it to value -1, and value 5 (Don’t know). Then the variables would  
fulfill the requirement of five categories. However, variable RC 5 was transferred to SPSS by 
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a group of researchers previously9
The dependent variable RC 10 goal attainment, is a dichotomous variable. I analyze this 
variable using binary logistic regression. The distribution of units is too skewed to perform 
linear regression
, without including category 4 Negative causal influence. 
This is perhaps because no one answered this category. Ten regimes answer “Don’t know” (5) 
on RC 5 Conformity causal. I have analyzed RC 5 Conformity causal and included value 5 
but this did not lead to changes in the results. On RC 10 Goal attainment causal only one unit 
answer category 4 Negative causal influence. No units answer “Don’t know” (5). For these 
reasons, I do not include value 4 or 5 in the analysis of RC 10 Goal attainment causal. In spite 
of the low number of categories on this variable I treat RC 5 and RC 10 as interval scale 
variables and use OLS as the method of analysis.     
10
Alternative c), using ordinal logistic regression, is also a possible way to analyze the ordinal 
variables. I chose not to use this method of analysis due to time constraints and lack of 
experience with this method. It would, however, be interesting to analyze the IRD data using 
ordinal logistic regression at a later stage and compare the results with the results from the 
analyses below.  
.  
6.3.3 Analysis 1 – Compliance   
The dependent variable 
Zürn measures his dependent construct “compliance” using the variable “RC 5 Conformity”. 
The results 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square R Square Change N 
1 .562 .315 .233 .315 66 
2 .668 .446 .200 .130 66 
Table 6.1 
 
                                                 
9 Data received from professor Arild Underdal. 
10 If the units are evenly distributed across the two values of the dependent variable (skewness less than .25/.75) 
and the number of units analyzed is large, linear regression can be used (Christophersen 2007:203).  
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Table 6.1 shows that Young’s variables account for 31.5 percent of the explained variance for 
the dependent variable, compliance. Zürn’s variables account for only 13 percent of the 
explained variance in the dependent variable, compliance. Together, the variables account for 
almost half of the explained variance for compliance, 44.6 percent. This indicates that 
Young’s independent variables are relatively more important for explaining compliance, than 
Zürn’s independent variables are. The results in table 6.1 are somewhat misleading, however, 
because both Young and Zürn use variable RA 47, which is attributed to Young in model 1. 
Since part of the variance in model 1 is attributable to RA 47, it is incorrect to conclude that 
the explained variance in model 1 is only attributable to Young’s variables. But except for 
variable RA 47, all of Zürn’s independent variables seem to explain much less of the variance 
in compliance than expected.  
Table 6.2 show the estimated effects for the independent variables on all dependent variables:  
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 Dependent variables 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
 RC 5 Conformity RC 5 Conformity causal RC 10 Goal attainment RC 10 Goal attainment 
causal 
RC 11 Problem change RC 11 Problem change 
causal 
 B β Sig B β Sig B Sig Exp (B) B β Sig B Β Sig B Β Sig 
MODEL 1                   
Constant 3.183  .000 2.874  .000 -3.060 .087 .047 1.814  .000 4.064  .000 2.568  .003 
RA 47_2 Notices of violation .380  .136 .261 .371 .158 .241 20.531 .999 8.253E8 .434 .241 .033 .562 .127 .299 1.529 .306 .012 
RA 47_3 Suspension of 
membership rights 
.042 .007 .947 -.168 -.036 .776    -1.535 -.300 .005 -1.500 -.201 .092 .429 .051 .659 
RA 47_4 Exclusion from 
membership 
                  
RA 47_5 Imposition of military 
punishments 
.693 .248 .045 -.059 -.025 .853 20.278 .999 6.405E8 .231 .115 .297 .050 .014 .910 .528 .132 .280 
RA 47_6 Imposition of 
financial/economic punishments 
.617 .185 .126 .401 .143 .284    .465 .215 .052 .354 .080 .516 .261 .052 .663 
RA 47_7 Capacity building -.527 -.180 .139 .384 .155 .247    .505 .280 .014 .757 .205 .103 1.317 .316 .011 
RA 47_8 Transition period -.950 -.356 .006 .901 .400 .005 19.529 .998 3.029E8 -.160 -.112 .339 .375 .128 .331 .303 .092 .475 
RA 47_9 Dissolution of 
linkages 
                  
RA 49 Compliance approach .183 .071 .537 -.138 -.064 .620 2.367 .015 10.667 .360 .190 .076 -.376 -.111 .365 .002 .001 .996 
MODEL 2                   
Constant 3.530  .037 1.052  .435 34.457 .998 9.211E14 2.290  .004 6.314  .000 2.108  .218 
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RA 47_2 Notices of violation .313 .112 .550 .210 .089 .621 -27.281 .998 .000 .314 .174 .212 -.043 -.010 .936 .884 .177 .159 
RA 47_3 Suspension of 
membership rights 
-.097 -.017 .900 .028 .006 .965    -1.873 -.366 .000 -2.030 -.272 .012 .121 .014 .893 
RA 47_4 Exclusion from 
membership 
                  
RA 47_5 Imposition of military 
punishments 
.472 .169 .310 -.196 -.083 .602 47.317 .995 3.543E20 .506 .251 .073 .178 .050 .697 .547 .137 .298 
RA 47_6 Imposition of 
financial/economic punishments 
-.036 .185 .947 -.077 -.027 .863    .796 .270 .005 .511 .115 .319 -.122 -.024 .835 
RA 47_7 Capacity building -.519 -.177 .241 .779 .315 .033    .753 .349 .004 .591 .160 .155 1.405 .337 .004 
RA 47_8 Transition period -.972 -.364 .022 .855 .380 .013 140.167 .991 7.475E60 .010 .007 .953 .886 .302 .018 .797 .241 .060 
RA 47_9 Dissolution of 
linkages 
                  
RA 49 Compliance approach .204 .079 .629 .245 .113 .475 2.615 .145 13.669 .254 .134 .249 -.047 -.014 .907 .475 .124 .307 
RA 11 Legally binding -.021 -.009 .951 -.142 -.070 .604 -30.103 .991 .000 -.336 -.230 .042 -.926 -.309 .008 -.390 -.115 .318 
RA 13 Rule differentiation -.578 -.126 .446 1.085 .280 .082 139.634 .993 4.390E60 .488 .242 .078 -.148 -.036 .787 .784 .168 .213 
RA 30_2 Secretariat 
independence – Less  
.053 .025 .896 -.566 -.317 .093 -32.306 .990 .000 -.368 -.263 .065 -.754 -.286 .056 -.779 -.263 .084 
RA 30_3 Secretariat 
independence – Some  
.277 .133 .530 -.215 -.122 .549 -1.865 .359 .155 -.200 -.151 .345 -.154 -.058 .725 -.080 -.027 .874 
RA 30_4 Secretariat 
independence – Strong 
-.002 .000 .997 .483 .184 .277 -93.642 .991 .000 -.538 -.367 .033 -.991 -.322 .054 -.375 -.108 .519 
RA 30_5 Secretariat 
independence – High  
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Table 6.2  
 
RA 33_2 Decision making 
bodies – Ad hoc COP 
-.270 -.135 .583 -.615 -.363 .129 1.312 .519 3.712 .401 .319 .086 -.142 -.056 .758 -.754 -.263 .158 
RA 33_3 Decision making 
bodies – Standing subsidiary 
body 
-.344 -.176 .343 -.443 -.268 .136 -30.134 .991 .000 -.031 -.026 .867 -1.405 -.576 .000 -2.049 -.746 .000 
RA 33_4 Decision making 
bodies – Ad hoc subsidiary 
body 
.777 .139 .362 -.037 -.008 .957    .327 .125 .334 -.811 -.151 .255 -.536 -.089 .511 
RA 45 – Reporting procedures -.059 -.027 .887 .210 .111 .539 -43.939 .991 .000 -.194 -.144 .276 -.030 -.010 .931 .152 .046 .703 
RF 49_2 Non-state actors – 
Member of nat. del. 
.532 .068 .648 .677 .102 .475    -.478 -.093 .424 .615 .059 .612 .561 .047 .687 
RF 49_3 Non-state actors – 
Member of neg. body 
.493 .250 .257 .661 .397 .065 -27.881 .992 .000 .446 .374 .038 .142 .060 .741 .583 .217 .240 
RF 49_4 Non-state actors – 
Pressure inside neg. 
.715 .288 .125 .199 .095 .595 110.125 .992 6.711E47 .143 .089 .533 -.094 -.028 .844 .588 .154 .285 
RF 49_5 Non-state actors – 
Pressure outside neg. 
.783 .381 .109 .565 .326 .153 1.783 .510 5.946 -.055 -.043 .815 -.060 -.022 .904 .547 .182 .338 
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In model 1, there are two significant effects. Other things being equal11,  conformity with 
regime requirements (compliance) increases by .693 scale units, when a regime12 uses 
military punishments instead of no compliance mechanisms (p<0.05)13
Considering that the scale for the variable RC 05 Conformity ranges from 1 (Behavior does 
not conform at all) to 5 (Behavior exceeds regime requirements), the effects of transition 
periods to achieve compliance (-.950 and -.972) are moderate to strong negative effects. The 
effect of imposing military punishments (.693) is a moderate positive effect. RA 47_8 
transition periods has Beta value -.356 in model 1 and -.364 in model 2. The Beta-values 
show that the effect of the compliance mechanism “transition period” is the strongest relative 
to the other effects. 
. Conformity with 
regime requirements decreases by .950 scale units when a regime grants transition periods to 
the parties instead of having no compliance mechanisms (p<0.01). In model 2, the conformity 
level decreases by .972 scale units for regimes using transition periods compared to having no 
compliance mechanisms (p<0.05). These effects give support to the enforcement perspective 
and Zürn’s conclusions, since military punishments (a negative incentive) have a positive 
influence on compliance levels, while transition periods (a positive incentive, associated with 
the management school) have a negative influence on compliance levels. However, one 
should also take into account the evidence from a univariate analysis of the data showing that 
most regimes rely on a management approach to compliance. This univariate analysis 
supports the results from the bivariate statistics by Young and Zürn, which show that a large 
majority of the regimes have a management approach to compliance. Furthermore, descriptive 
statistics of RA 47 compliance mechanisms show that most regimes have no compliance 
mechanisms (43 percent), 10.9 percent use the mechanism “granting of a transition period” 
and 7.9 percent use the mechanism “imposition of military punishments”. Only two regimes 
use the compliance mechanism “suspension of membership rights”. The results for this 
category are therefore likely to be somewhat less robust than the other results. Apart from this 
category, the units spread out fairly evenly (between 3.6 and 6.7 percent) across the rest of the 
categories of RA 47 compliance mechanisms (capacity building, imposition of 
financial/economic punishments and issuance of notices of violation).  
                                                 
11 This condition applies to all the effects throughout the six analyses. 
12 The units of analysis are “regime elements” but in the interpretations of results the word “regime” is used 
instead for simplifying reasons.   
13 All the effects are estimated expected effects. 
66 
 
 
6.3.4 Analysis 2 – The regimes’ causal influence on compliance   
The dependent variable 
Zürn also examines to what extent the regime has a causal influence on the parties’ 
compliance. He operationalizes this construct using the variable “RC 5 Conformity causal”. 
“0: Not applicable” and “5: Don’t know” are user-defined missing. The scale then includes 
only three values: “1: Little or no causal influence”, “2: Modest causal influence”, and “3: 
Large causal influence”.  
The results 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
R Square 
Change N 
1 .400 .160 .058 .160 66 
2 .697 .486 .258 .326 66 
Table 6.3 
Estimates of R Square reveal that Young’s variables account for 16 percent of the explained 
variance of a regime’s causal influence on compliance. Zürn’s variables account for 32.6 
percent of the explained variance, and together the variables account for 48.6 percent of the 
explained variance in the dependent variable.  
In model 1, there is one significant effect. The results show that the regimes’ causal influence 
on compliance increases by .901 scale units when regimes use the compliance mechanism 
“granting of a transition period”, compared to regimes with no compliance mechanisms 
(p<0.01).    
In model 2, when Zürn’s independent variables are added to the analysis, there are two 
significant estimated effects. First, the data show that the regimes’ causal influence on 
compliance increases by .779 scale units when regimes use capacity building as a compliance 
mechanism compared to using no compliance mechanisms (p<0.05). The effect of granting a 
transition period remains significant but decreases from .901 to .855 (p<0.05).  
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The results do not support the hypothesis that Young’s independent variables have large 
explanatory value on the regimes’ causal influence on compliance. Zürn’s independent 
variables explain much more of the variance in the dependent variable than Young’s.  
6.3.5 Analysis 3 – Goal attainment 
The dependent variable 
The first operational variable measuring the theoretical construct of regime effectiveness, is 
RC10 Goal attainment. This is a variable with only two values: “1: No, goal not fulfilled”, 
and “2: Yes, goal fulfilled” (“0: Not applicable” and “3: Don’t know” are defined as missing 
values).  
Excluded variables and N 
The independent variables RA 30_5 Secretariat independence – High, RA 47_3 Suspension of 
membership rights, RA 47_4 Exclusion from membership, RA 47_6 Imposition of 
financial/economic punishments, RA 47_7 capacity building, RA 47_9 Dissolution of 
linkages, RA 33_4 Decision making bodies – Ad hoc subsidiary body, and RF 49_2 – Non-
state actors – Member of national delegation, are excluded from the model, either because 
they are constants or too skewed and thereby create problems for the analysis. N = 76.  
The results 
The numbers indicating model fit14
The estimated regression coefficient for RA 49 Compliance approach is the only significant 
effect in the model. This effect is significant (p<0.05) in model 1 and indicates a positive 
relationship between compliance approach and goal attainment. In other words, the odds for 
fulfilling the goals in a regime increase by the factor 10.667 for regimes adhering to a 
management approach to compliance, compared to regimes adhering to an enforcement 
approach to compliance.  
 suggest that the model improves (p<0.01) when Zürn’s 
variables are added to the analysis in model 2.   
                                                 
14 -2LL, Cox Snell R Square, Nagelkerke R Square, Omnibus test, Hosmer Lemeshow Chi-Square.   
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This result gives strong support to Young’s conclusion about the value of choosing a 
management approach to compliance.  
6.3.6 Analysis 4 – The regimes’ causal influence on goal attainment 
The dependent variable 
Young also examines to what extent the regime exerts causal influence on the goal attainment 
of the regime. The operational dependent variable measuring this is RC 10 – Goals fulfilled 
causal. The values “0: Not applicable”, “1: Don’t know” and “4: Negative causal influence” 
are defined as missing. Three values remain: “1: Little or no causal impact”, “2: Modest 
causal influence”, and “3: Large causal influence”.  
The results 
Model R  R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
R Square 
Change N 
1 .552 .304 .232 .304 75 
2 .761 .580 .424 .275 75 
Table 6.4 
The analysis of the regime’s causal influence on goal attainment, the second dependent 
variable analyzed by Young, reveals some interesting results. Young’s independent variables 
explain 30.4 percent of the variance in the dependent variable while Zürn’s independent 
variables actually explain 27.5 percent. Together, the independent variables explain more than 
half of the variance in the dependent variable (58 percent).  
In model 1, there are three significant effects. The model estimates that the regimes’ causal 
influence on goal attainment increases by .434 scale units when regimes use the compliance 
mechanism “notices of violation”, instead of no compliance mechanisms (p<0.05). The 
regimes’ causal influence on goal attainment increases by .505 scale units when regimes use 
capacity building compared to no compliance mechanisms (p<0.05). On the contrary, the 
regimes’ causal influence on goal attainment decreases by 1.535 scale units when regimes use 
suspension of membership rights compared to no compliance mechanisms.  
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In model 2, where Zürn’s independent variables are added, there are six significant effects. 
Again, the variable RA 47 compliance mechanisms – used by both Young and Zürn – is 
predominant. The numbers again show that a regime’s causal influence on goal attainment 
decreases by 1.873 scale units when regimes use suspension of membership rights compared 
to using no compliance mechanisms (p<0.01). In contrast, regimes’ causal influence on goal 
attainment increases by .796 scale units when regimes use financial or economic punishments 
compared to when they use no compliance mechanisms (p<0.01). These two effects are 
strong, since the dependent variable only consists of three values. Regimes’ causal influence 
on goal attainment also increases by .753 scale units when regimes use capacity building as a 
compliance mechanism compared to regimes with no compliance mechanisms (p<0.01). The 
effect of variable RF 49_3 Non-state actor – member of negotiating body, is also significant. 
This variable concerns the role of non-state actors in the negotiations towards an agreement, 
treaty etc. A regime’s causal influence on goal attainment increases by .446 scale units when 
non-state actors are members of the negotiating body compared to those cases where non-
state actors only have an observer role (p<0.05). Furthermore, the regimes’ causal influence 
on goal attainment decreases by .336 scale units when rules are legally binding compared to 
when they are not (p<0.05). A regime’s causal influence on goal attainment decreases by .538 
scale units if it has a strongly independent secretariat (RA 30_4) compared to a secretariat 
with no independence (p<0.05).    
The fact that Zürn’s independent variables explain almost as much of the variance in the 
dependent variable as Young’s do, runs counter to my expectations. It could be an indication 
that Young’s analysis of regime effectiveness perhaps could have benefited from adding more 
independent variables because of the more complex nature of regime effectiveness compared 
to compliance. The positive effect of having non-state actors as members of the negotiating 
body (RF 49_3 Zürn’s independent variable) supports this.    
6.3.7 Analysis 5 – Problem change 
The dependent variable 
The other operational variable measuring the theoretical construct of regime effectiveness is 
problem change (RC 10). The values “0: Not applicable” and “6: Don’t know” are user 
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defined as missing. The scale then ranges from “1: The problem worsened considerably” to 
“5: The problem improved considerably”.  
The results 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5 
The table shows that there are large differences between the explained variance in model 1 
and model 2. While the independent variables in model 1 only explain 10.4 percent of the 
variance in the dependent variable, the independent variables in model 2 explain 45.7 percent 
more. This means that Zürn’s independent variables actually explain more than four times as 
much of the variance in problem change, the dependent variable used by Young, as Young’s 
independent variables do.  
In model 1, there are no significant effects. In model 2, it is once again the variable used by 
both Young and Zürn (RA 47 compliance mechanisms) that proves to have significant effects 
on problem change. More specifically, the problem becomes worse by 2.030 scale units, when 
regime elements suspend membership rights instead of having no compliance mechanisms 
(p<0.05). In other words, suspension of membership rights has a very strong negative effect 
on problem change. But the robustness of these results should be questioned because only two 
regimes use suspension of membership rights. The problem improves by .886 scale units, 
however, when member states are granted a transition period compared to when there are no 
compliance mechanisms (p<0.05). Granting a transition period has a moderate to strong 
positive effect on problem change. The estimated coefficient for RA 11 shows that the 
problem becomes worse by .926 scale units for regimes with legally binding rules compared 
to regimes with soft law or rules that are not legally binding (p<0.01). Finally, the problem 
becomes worse by 1.405 scale units for regimes making decisions in a standing subsidiary 
body compared to those regimes making decisions at regular meetings of the conference of 
the parties (p<0.01).      
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
R Square 
Change 
 
N 
1 .322 .104 .013 .104 77 
2 .749 .561 .404 .457 77 
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6.3.8 Analysis 6 – The regimes’ causal influence on problem change 
The dependent variable 
Also measuring regime effectiveness is the operational variable RC11 Problem change causal. 
“0: Not applicable” and “6: Don’t know” are defined as missing. The scale ranges from “1: 
Little or no causal impact” to “5: Very strong causal influence”. 
The results 
Model R  R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
R Square 
Change 
 
N 
1 .380 .145 .058 .145 77 
2 .738 .544 .382 .400 77 
Table 6.6 
R Square results for RC 11 problem change causal are similar to the results for RC 11 
problem change. Again, Zürn’s independent variables explain far more of the variance in the 
dependent variable than Young’s independent variables. Young’s independent variables 
explain 14.5 percent of the variance in RC 11 problem change causal while Zürn’s 
independent variables account for 40 percent of the explained variance. 
The estimated coefficients in the model once again confirm the prominent role of RA 47 
compliance mechanisms. In model 1, RA 47_2 Notices of violation and RA 47_7 capacity 
building have strong positive effects on the regime’s causal influence on problem change. The 
regime’s causal influence on problem change increases by 1.529 scale units when a regime 
uses notices of violation as a compliance mechanism instead of no compliance mechanisms 
(p<0.05). Furthermore, regimes’ causal influence on problem change increases by 1.317 scale 
units for regimes facilitating capacity building compared to having no compliance 
mechanisms (p<0.05). In model 2, the effect of capacity building has increased to 1.405 
(p<0.01). The effect of notices of violation is no longer significant but the effect of what 
decision-making bodies a regime has provided for (RA 33) is a significant and strongly 
negative effect. The regime’s causal influence on problem change decreases with 2.048 scale 
units when a regime makes decisions in a standing subsidiary body instead of making 
decisions in regular meetings of the conference of the parties (p<0.01).  
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For both of the dependent variables regarding problem change, Zürn’s independent variables 
account for a surprisingly large proportion of the explained variance. Looking at significant 
effects, his independent variables (except RA 47 compliance mechanisms) more frequently 
affect goal attainment and problem change than compliance. This might indicate that many of 
the independent variables chosen to analyze compliance are more relevant to analyze regime 
effectiveness.  
6.4 Discussion of the results      
In the beginning of this chapter, I presented three aims for my (multivariate) analyses: i) to 
explain more of the variance in the dependent variable, ii) to find more robust results by 
controlling for other independent variables when analyzing an independent variable’s effect 
on a dependent variable, and iii) find out which independent variables affect which dependent 
variables, and which independent variables have no effects at all. In this section, I discuss the 
results from the six analyses in light of these aims. 
I) Increased explained variance 
Does the explained variance increase when I add more independent variables to the model? 
The results from the analyses show that the explained variance in the dependent variables 
increases, in some cases substantially, when more independent variables are added to each 
analysis. An interesting finding is that Young’s independent variables explain much more of 
the variance in the dependent variable compliance than Zürn’s variables do. This indicates 
that Young’s independent variables are better at explaining compliance than Zürn’s 
independent variables are. But it could also be that RA 47 compliance mechanisms, the 
variable used by both Young and Zürn (but added to model 1 with Young’s independent 
variables) is the variable with the most explanatory value when it comes to compliance. The 
relatively strong and significant estimated effects of this variable also support this. 
My analyses also show that Zürn’s independent variables explain more than half of the 
variance in both of Young’s dependent variables, goal attainment and problem change. This 
indicates that explaining regime effectiveness with only two independent variables (RA 47 
compliance mechanisms and RA 49 compliance approach, the two independent variables in 
Young’s analysis) is insufficient and that more independent variables are needed. This is 
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perhaps due to the relatively more complex nature of regime effectiveness compared to 
compliance. The analyses of Young’s dependent variables show that factors such as non-state 
participation (RA 30), the legal nature of the rules (RA 11) and the autonomy of decision-
making bodies (RA 33) (variables used by Zürn) affect regime effectiveness. 
II) Controlled effects – identifying robust results 
Do some of the effects resulting from the bivariate analyses of Young and Zürn lose their 
significance when controlling for other independent variables? The results from my six 
analyses show that many fewer variables affect compliance and regime effectiveness when 
controlled effects are estimated than when only bivariate relationships are estimated.  
Most of Zürn’s independent variables, except for RA 47 compliance mechanisms, have small 
or no significant effects on compliance. The explained variance of Zürn’s independent 
variables on compliance is not as high as one would expect either. This indicates that several 
of the independent variables in Zürn’s analysis have little or no influence on compliance when 
controlling for other independent variables. In other words, some of the independent variables  
that influence compliance in the bivariate analyses performed by Zürn do not influence 
compliance when we control for other explanatory variables.  
Variable RA 49 Compliance approach, one of the two independent variables used by Young, 
is significant in only one of the analyses (Analysis 3, Goal attainment). This variable has 
bivariate effects on goal attainment and problem change (according to Young’s analyses), but 
these effects lose their significance when the controlled effects are estimated.  
III) The estimated effects 
Which independent variables affect which dependent variables?  
 RC 5 
CONFORMITY 
RC 5 
CONFORMITY 
CAUSAL 
RC 10 GOAL 
ATTAINMENT 
RC 10 GOAL 
ATTAINMENT 
CAUSAL 
RC 11 
PROBLEM 
CHANGE 
RC 11 
PROBLEM 
CHANGE 
CAUSAL 
Imposition of 
military 
punishments (RA 
47_5) 
 
+ 
     
Transition period 
(RA 47_8) 
- +   +  
Capacity building 
(RA 47_7) 
 +  +  + 
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Compliance 
approach (RA 49) 
  + (management 
approach) 
   
Notices of violation 
(RA 47_2) 
   +  + 
Imposition of 
financial/economic 
punishments (RA 
47_6) 
    
+ 
  
Suspension of 
membership rights 
(RA 47_3) 
   - -  
Legally binding 
rules (RA 11) 
   - -  
Strongly 
independent 
secretariat (RA 
30_4) 
    
+ 
  
Non-state actors 
members of 
negotiating body 
(RF 49_3) 
    
+ 
  
Standing subsidiary 
decision-making 
bodies (RA 33_3) 
    - - 
Table 6.7 
RA 47 Compliance mechanisms influences the dependent variable RC 5 Conformity. More 
specifically, military punishments have a positive effect on compliance and transition periods 
have a negative effect on compliance. None of the other independent variables seem to affect 
compliance, according to my results.  
RA 47 Compliance mechanisms, in particular capacity building and transition period, 
positively influence the dependent variable RC 5 Conformity causal.  
RA 49 Compliance approach influences the dependent variable RC 10 Goal attainment. The 
result supports that a management approach to compliance positively influences goal 
attainment.  
RA 47 Compliance mechanisms influences the dependent variable RC 10 Goal attainment 
causal. More specifically, capacity building, notices of violation and use of financial and/or 
economic punishments have a positive influence on the regime’s causal influence on goal 
attainment while suspension of membership rights has a negative influence. RF 49_3 Non-
state actor – member of negotiating body has a positive influence on regimes’ causal 
influence on goal attainment. RA 11 legally binding rules  and RA 30_4 Strong independence 
of the secretariat have a negative influence.  
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RA 47 compliance mechanisms influences the dependent variable RC 11 Problem change. 
Suspension of membership rights negatively influences the problem while transition periods 
positively influence the problem. Legally binding rules (RA 11) and a standing subsidiary 
decision making body (RA 33_3) negatively influence the problem.  
Notices of violation  and capacity building (RA 47) influence the dependent variable RC 11 
Problem change causal positively, while having a standing subsidiary decision-making body 
(RA 33_3) negatively influences the regimes’ causal influence on problem change.  
Not counting the three variables that are excluded from the analyses due to mulitcolinearity 
(RA 12, RA 46 and RF 19), there are two independent variables that have no significant 
effects on any of the dependent variables, according to my results. These are RA 13 Rule 
differentiation and RA 45 Reporting procedures. These are both independent variables used 
by Zürn in his analysis of compliance.  
6.4.1 Support for the hypotheses? 
My results partly support Zürn’s hypotheses 1: “Incentives improve compliance rates” and 4: 
“Responsiveness to problems of implementation improves compliance rates”. This is due to 
the significant positive effects of the variable RA 47, compliance mechanisms, which 
operationalizes both “incentives” and “responsiveness” on compliance. Military punishments 
(negative incentive) affect compliance positively, while the effect of transition periods 
(positive incentive) on compliance is actually negative. This reveals that not all incentives 
improve compliance rates, and that my results therefore only partly support the hypotheses. 
None of Zürn’s other hypotheses gain support from my results.  
My results mostly support the hypotheses created by me based on the theoretical assumptions 
accounted for in Young’s chapter. The many positive effects of RA 47 compliance 
mechanisms on both compliance, goal attainment and problem change support hypotheses 1 
“Mechanisms capable of generating rewards and penalties improve compliance rates” and 2 
“Mechanisms capable of generating rewards and penalties improve regime effectiveness”. 
The results show that positive and negative compliance mechanisms are important for 
compliance and for regime effectiveness. This supports the view of the enforcement school.  
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My results partly support hypothesis 3 “Operation of compliance mechanisms, but not 
necessarily the use of penalties and rewards, improve compliance rates”. Capacity building 
has a positive effect on compliance, but granting a transition period to the parties has a 
negative effect on compliance. Hypothesis 4 “Operation of compliance mechanisms, but not 
necessarily the use of penalties and rewards, improve regime effectiveness” gains support 
from my results. The effects of capacity building are positive and significant on both 
compliance, and regime effectiveness. Granting a transition period also positively influences 
regime effectiveness. My results thus support the views of the management school.  
My results do not, however, support hypotheses 5 “There is no clearcut relationship between 
compliance mechanisms and compliance rates” and 6 “There is no clearcut relationship 
between compliance mechanisms and regime effectiveness”. The effects of RA 47 
compliance mechanisms on both compliance and regime effectiveness support that there is a 
relationship between compliance mechanisms and compliance, and compliance mechanisms 
and regime effectiveness. In fact, the data show that these relationships are clear and strong. 
Thus, my results do not support the views of the social-practice perspective.  
6.4.2 Enforcement or management? 
My results provide no clear indication of which approach to compliance is the better one. The 
results from one analysis (analysis 3) favor the management school. Founded on the 
theoretical arguments of the two schools, it is fair to assume that about four of the categories 
on RA 47 compliance mechanisms correspond with enforcement school assumptions (notices 
of violation, suspension of membership rights, military punishments and financial/economic 
punishments), and two categories correspond with management school assumptions (capacity 
building and transition period). The table below presents the frequency of the moderate to 
strong effects of these compliance mechanisms in the six analyses: 
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Table 6.8 
Counting effects of the compliance mechanisms and their positive and/or negative effects on 
compliance, goal attainment and problem change, indicates no preference for either 
theoretical school. However, when looking at the effects of capacity building and transition 
periods together with the result of RA 49 Compliance approach in analysis 3, my results give 
somewhat stronger support to the management school than the enforcement school. Overall, 
the results support a mixed approach to compliance, with the use of both positive and negative 
compliance mechanisms.  
6.5 Summary 
My multivariate analyses take us only a few steps closer to determining what factors 
contribute to the different conclusions of Young and Zürn. Nevertheless, the analyses provide 
at least three findings: First, adding more independent variables to Young’s analyses of 
regime effectiveness creates more robust results; the explained variance of regime 
effectiveness increases substantially. Second, several of the results from the bivariate analyses 
of Young and Zürn are either non-existent or insignificant in my multivariate analyses, where 
controlled effects are estimated. In particular, most of the effects of Zürn’s independent 
variables on compliance disappear or become insignificant when controlling for other 
independent variables, with the exception of RA 47 compliance mechanisms. Third, the 
 Enforcement school – 
compliance mechanisms 
Management school – 
compliance mechanisms 
Effect on conformity, goal 
attainment and/or problem 
change 
+ - + - 
Capacity building   IIII  
Transition period   IIII I 
Notices of violations   II  
Suspension of membership 
rights 
II I   
Imposition of military 
punishments 
I    
Imposition of 
financial/economic 
punishments 
I    
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results from my analyses give support to both the enforcement school and the management 
school, but slightly favor the management school.  
Together, the results from my analyses suggest that if Young and Zürn would have included 
all relevant independent variables and performed multivariate analyses (providing controlled 
effects), their analyses would have become more robust, and their conclusions possibly more 
similar. 
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7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I first provide a summary of my thesis (7.1) and then present the main findings 
(7.2). 
7.1 Summary 
In this thesis, I have examined the analyses of Oran Young and Michael Zürn in Breitmeier et 
al (2006) using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. My aim has been to find out what 
causes their differing conclusions with regard to approach to compliance. 
First, in chapter 2, I reviewed theory about compliance and regime effectiveness, including 
their approaches to compliance: the management school and the enforcement school. I also 
briefly accounted for the social practice perspective on compliance. 
Next, in chapter 3, I considered the analysis of horizontal compliance mechanisms and 
compliance by Michael Zürn. Here, I provided information about five aspects of his analysis: 
data, constructs, operationalization and variables, results and conclusions.  
In chapter 4, I considered the analysis of compliance mechanisms and regime effectiveness by 
Oran Young. Again, I presented information about data, constructs, operationalization and 
variables, results and conclusions. The identification of these aspects of Young’s and Zürn’s 
analyses was necessary to facilitate a comparison between the two analyses. 
In chapter 5, I compared the analyses of Young and Zürn on the five dimensions used as a 
framework in chapters 3 and 4. This comparison identified similarities and differences in 
order to find out why their conclusions differ. The comparison showed that two aspects of the 
analyses are identical, while the other aspects differ. But it failed to show clearly which of 
these differences (if any) caused the differing conclusions reached by Young and Zürn.  
In chapter 6, I performed six multivariate regression analyses of compliance and regime 
effectiveness using the variables from Young’s and Zürn’s analyses. 
7.2 Main findings  
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The results from my analyses provide no clear answers to the research question of what can 
explain the differing conclusions of Young and Zürn. This is perhaps not so strange. If the 
causes of the different conclusions were obvious and clear, the authors themselves probably 
would have spotted them while writing the book.  
However, my results do provide at least five possible reasons why the conclusions of Young 
and Zürn differ:  
First, my qualitative comparison of the analyses of Young and Zürn in chapter 5 shows that 
higher construct validity could perhaps have led to more similar results and possibly more 
similar conclusions. 
Second, in research in general, researchers sometimes interpret results differently. I have 
found indications pointing to the fact that Young and Zürn have interpreted quite similar 
results from their analyses differently, with Young tending to focus more strongly on the 
results associated with the management school and Zürn tending to focus more strongly on 
the results associated with the enforcement school. This could contribute to the differing 
conclusions to a certain extent.   
Third, my statistical analyses in Chapter 6 show that Young could have included more 
independent variables in his analyses of regime effectiveness to increase the explained 
variance. By including independent variables that explain more of the construct regime 
effectiveness, his results and conclusions would have become more robust.  
Fourth, several of the results from the bivariate analyses of Young and Zürn either disappear 
or lose their significance when I estimate controlled effects in my multivariate analyses. For 
instance, most of the effects of Zürn’s independent variables on compliance, with the 
exception of RA 47 compliance mechanisms, have no effects on compliance according to my 
results.  
Together, the third and fourth finding suggest that if Young and Zürn would have included all 
relevant independent variables and performed multivariate analyses (providing controlled 
effects), their analyses would have become more robust, and their conclusions possibly more 
similar. 
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Finally, my results give support to both the enforcement school and the management school, 
although slightly favoring the management school. Overall, my results support a mixed 
approach to compliance with the use of both positive and negative compliance mechanisms.     
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